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ABSTRACT

Mehrabi, Wais. M.A., International and Comparative Politics Graduate Program, School of
Public and International Affairs, Wright State University, 2018.
Politics of International Recognition: The Case of Aspirant States

Separatist polities that have managed to break away from their parent states and meet the basic
criteria for statehood seek other states’ formal recognition to achieve full statehood and
membership of the international society. There is no established pattern to explain external
recognition of statehood empirically and theoretically. Kosovo declared independence and
attained widespread recognition while Somaliland, despite successful separation from Somalia,
has not. What factors explain states’ recognition decisions, or the selective conferring of
recognition? The existing literature indicates that national interests, domestic politics, systematic
level factors, international legal and normative standards, regime type, and identity politics shape
recognition decisions. This thesis attempted to enhance the literature by focusing on lessexplored factors through a Large-N cross-national quantitative analysis of ten cases. This study
argues that when all other potential explanations are constant or absent, susceptibility of states to
domestic separatism, regime type, and religious affinities influence states’ recognition decisions.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to explain what factors motivate states to extend or withhold
recognition to an aspirant state. An aspirant state is an unrecognized or partially recognized
recognition-seeking separatist polity that has managed to break away from its parent state and
meets the Montevideo Convention criteria for statehood – (1) a permanent population; (2) a
defined territory; (3) a government; and (4) capacity to enter into relations with the other states –
which aspires to become a sovereign independent state and be admitted to the international
community. Aspirant states come into existence often as a result of civil wars and ethnic
conflicts. The mainstream conflict resolution approaches which rely on power-sharing
arrangements that result in shared sovereignty or some form of federal solution between the
parent state and subunits have worked in some cases, Belgium and Spain, but proved less
effective in others such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Eurasian separatist entities (Berg, 2007; Bindebir
et al., 2003; Roper, 2004).
While a number of separatist entities, Iraqi Kurdish separatists for example, have reached
a temporary settlement through a power-sharing scheme or ethno-federalism arrangement, others
have failed. In cases of failed federalization plans, power-sharing arrangements, or unification
with parent or a different third state, the separatist entities have persisted in their aspiration for
statehood, leaving them as de facto states who no longer wish to become part of their parent
states (Berg, 2007; Diez, 2000; Bahcheli et.al., 2004; Keane 2002; Pegg, 1998). These entities
are not temporary anomalies but rather have become permanent features of the international
system without achieving international recognition despite fulfilling the basic criteria for
1

statehood. Their unrecognized status results in their international isolation and subjection to
excessive intervention by a major patron state.
If separatist movements fulfill the basic requirements for statehood, why are they not
admitted to the international society as sovereign states? What causes states to deny or grant
these entities the pathway to full statehood and membership in the United Nations? Why have
some of these entities received partial recognition while others remain unrecognized? This thesis
tackles these questions through a Large-N cross-national quantitative analysis of ten cases of
aspirant states. This study postulates that vulnerability of states to domestic separatism,
competitive democratization between the parent and aspirant state, and religious affinities
influence states’ recognition decisions.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The background subsection provides a brief
introduction to aspirant states and their position in the international system. The statement of the
problem explores the need for research on international recognition of aspirant states. The
research question section elaborates on the research questions guiding this thesis. The subsection
on significance of study provides a rationale of the importance of this study and its potential
contribution to the literature. Lastly, organization of the thesis outlines the structure of the thesis
and distribution of chapters.

Background
Sovereign and recognized states are considered the most powerful principal actors in the
international system and politics. Presently, there are 193 states with often disputed but fairly
stable borders (Members-UN). However, they are not the sole units in the international system.
Political authority, in practice, has been divided among both state and non-state actors. The
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constellation of non-state actors is numerous. For example, International Government
Organizations (IGOs) like United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) like Amnesty International and Red Cross, and
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) like Wal-Mart.
The study of international relations has traditionally focused on states and other major
non-state actors. However, non-state actors, such as Somaliland, which displays accoutrements
of statehood except for international legal status, membership in the United Nations, and full or
widespread international recognition (Florea, 2014), have received comparatively less attention.
These entities that “exist in an unrecognized or partially recognized limbo, neither a full part of
the international system, nor an ungoverned space” (Thomas, 2014, p.1), are important for
understanding global politics. Though separatist entities fulfilling basic state functions with
partial or no international recognition have existed at various times during the twentieth century,
their number increased following WWII. Over 34 secessionist entities meeting the basic
requirements of statehood except international recognition existed between 1945 and 2011
(Florea, 2014, p.792). An assessment of literature shows the precise definition and terminology
describing non-state separatist entities is ambiguous. There are many terms used to define such
entities, for example unrecognized states (Caspersen, 2012), state-like entities (King, 2001),
states-within-states (Spears, 2004), quasi-states (Kolstø, 2006), pseudo-states (Kolossov and
O’Loughlin, 1999), contested states (Geldenhuys, 2009), aspirant, separatist, secessionist, and
informal states (Coggins, 2014; Isachenko, 2012). These entities further proliferated in the postCold War era following dissolution of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Socialist
Federal Republics of Yugoslavia (SFRY).
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Achievement of full statehood and admission to the international society for these entities
has varied. Some entities—Slovenia, Croatia, and the former Soviet Baltic states, for example—
went through an expedited process of widespread recognition and admission to the UN, while
Somaliland, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, South Ossetia, Northern Cyprus, and
Abkhazia remain unrecognized or partially recognized.
The primary distinction between success and failure in attaining full statehood and
international legal status for these entities is recognition by existing sovereign states, which
affirms their external legitimacy, admission to the international society, and subsequent
membership as sovereign states in the UN. Coggins asserts that “statehood does not inhere in
governmental control on the ground alone. Without external legitimacy, an actor is not a state”
(2014, p. 8). Recognition confers an international legal status to these entities, because only
when a “new state has been recognized does it become a subject of international law, and this
initially only with respect to the existing states recognizing it” (Hillgruber, 1998, p.492). Thus,
international recognition is an essential step for these nascent states to achieve full statehood and
inclusion in the international society.

Statement of the Problem
While most scholars focused on the internal dynamics of aspirant states and generated
invaluable scholarly understanding about the creation, evolution, development, and impact of
these entities (Pegg,2017), an assessment of the literature shows a severe dearth of scholarship
focusing primarily on international recognition of these entities. The existing research has
focused on internal dynamics of aspirant states, especially state- and nation-building processes,
as well as democratization and development of political and economic institutions. Though a
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lack of international recognition causes unique problems for aspirant states undertaking stateand nation-building initiatives, nonetheless they have continued their efforts persistently,
achieving variegated degrees of success.
Several scholars have extensively researched these topics. For instance, Kolstø argues
that aspirant states created following military successes in civil wars focus on memories of
suffering and military glories as such events “increase the possibility of exploiting war memories
for nation-building purposes” (Kolstø, 2006, p. 730). These past experiences are effective tools
in constructing a shared identity through “education, propaganda, ideology, and state symbols”
(Pegg, 2017, p.5). Many aspirant states “play up the wartime experience, praising martyrs and
building memorials” (Byman and King, 2012, p. 48). These themes are explored in other
scholarly works on nation-building processes among aspirant states like King, (2001), Lynch,
(2002), and Richards & Smith, (2015). Ethnic homogenization, usually following mass
population displacement during civil and secessionist wars, is another constituent element of
nation-building among some aspirant states. This element is used by Nagorno-Karabakh, South
Ossetia, Northern Cyprus, and others for their nation-building processes (O’Loughlin et al.,
2013; O’Loughlin et al., 2011; Ó Beacháin, 2012; Pegg and Kolstø, 2015).
The scholarship is also rich on state-building among aspirant states. The lack of
international recognition serves as a substantial impetus among some aspirant states to
aggressively engage in effective state-building both to safeguard their claimed territory and
increase their chances of international recognition (Kolstø and Blakkisrud, 2008; Pegg, 2017).
Caspersen (2012, p.105) maintains that recognition offers “a powerful incentive for building an
effective entity; an entity which can defend itself and which is deemed internationally
acceptable”. Other scholars also have focused on state-building among aspirant states as
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incentive to gain international recognition and increase their existence through fortifying
political and military institutions necessary for stable statehood (Bakke et al., 2014; Berg and
Mölder, 2012; Lynch,2002; Ó Beacháin et al.,2016).
Several scholars have explored institutional building and democratization among aspirant
states. Though external legitimacy and full sovereignty is an essential component for
democratization and political development, Tansy (2001) has provided a theoretical
demonstration that democratization is possible without external sovereignty and international
recognition. Other scholars also maintain that a number of aspirant states have engaged in
democratization to legitimize their existence and as a strategy of “earned sovereignty” (Broers,
2013; Caspersen, 2008, 2011; Scharf, 2003; Richards, 2014; Ryngaert and Sobrie 2011; Voller,
2013) to increase their chances of recognition.
The literature on international recognition of aspirant states is limited and often case
specific. There are few systematic works directly focusing empirically and theoretically on
recognition of aspirant states. Coggins (2011, 2014), in her study of recognition of aspirant
states, focused on the role of great powers. Crawford (1995, 1996) studied the unilateral
recognition of former USSR states. Mirilovic and Siroky (2014, 2015) studied the connection
between religion and international recognition in the case of Palestine and Kosovo. Ozpek (2014)
studied the relationship between recognition and regime type. His study, like Coggins’, focused
only on great powers in the international system. In sum, the literature on recognition of aspirant
states has two gaps and weaknesses. First, the existing scholarship is case specific or limited to a
select number of recognizers, the great powers for example. Second, scholars have focused on
classic power-politics explanations grounded in national interests and the realist tradition of
International Relations (IR). Other major variables are under-researched. This study will fill the
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gap in the literature by expanding on potential factors which shape recognition decisions. This
research covers all UN member states in order to establish an in-depth understanding of
recognition, which can yield consequential results for establishment of a general pattern of
behavior among states and their recognition decisions.

Research Question
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and evaluate the factors, motivations, and reasons
behind states’ recognition decisions. The primary research question guiding this thesis is: what
factors explain recognition of aspirant states by the existing member states of the international
community? An assessment of the literature shows that the potential factors behind states’
recognition decisions are diverse. The explanations that emerge repeatedly include international
law and normative explanations, system level explanations, domestic and national politics of the
states, the role of home or parent states, the regime type of the states, and identity politics. An
initial speculative answer for the research question is that three variables are essential factors in
influencing states’ decisions to extend or withhold recognition to a (new) state; vulnerability of
states to domestic separatism, regime type of the recognizer states, and religious affinities
between states. This research will evaluate the effectiveness of these broad groups of factors on
recognition through a Large-N quantitative analysis research design to establish general patterns
in foreign policy decisions and recognition of aspirant states among both major powers and
smaller states.
Another gap in the literature is “prolonged terminological and definitional battles that
have done comparatively little to advance scholarly understanding” about these entities (Peg,
2017, p.3). This research will address the proliferation of different terms and definitional
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disputes and propose a parsimonious definition and term that encompasses all the necessary
components of these entities.

Significance of Study
Aspirant states have become permanent features of the international system. Their
existence is a challenge to the fundamental assumptions about sovereignty of states. As such,
recognition of these entities is important both for sustainability and democratic development of
these nascent states and equally consequential for the existing states in the system. There are
several major significances of this study.
First, the literature on international recognition of (new) states is limited and case
specific. This research will contribute to the literature by evaluating the existing explanations and
expanding their application to all UN member states in order to establish their validity and
generalizability. International recognition is a less explored and under-theorized area of IR. This
research will incorporate new explanations and variables to fill the gap in the literature by
identifying factors that motivate states to extend or withhold recognition and establishing a
general pattern for states’ policy towards aspirant states.
Second, the quest for recognition is a significant incentive for aspirant states undertaking
effective nation- and state-building, development of political and economic institutions, and
democratization (Richards and Smith, 2015). Nonrecognition can potentially reverse these
achievements for aspirant states. These improvements are essential especially for entities, such as
black spots, which do not fit the criteria for aspirant states and whose future potentially depends
on treatment of aspirant states. Stainslawski (2008) maintains that nonrecognition can reverse
aspirant states to “black spots” which “represent territories in which and from which both
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transnational organized crime (TOC) and terrorism operate, often becoming criminal-terrorist
entities” (Stanislawski, 2008; p. 360-367). A lack of recognition can threaten the democratization
process among aspirant states. As Caspersen notes these entities “often run out of steam and find
themselves in a seemingly perpetual transition; they make steps towards democratization but
reach a plateau fairly early on and may even experience democratic setbacks” (2012, p.98).
Though aspirant states have made considerable progress in fortifying their statehood
despite a lack of international recognition, they are prone to disintegration, economic depression,
and international isolation, which makes them more dependent on a patron state for support and
survival. International law and customary practice in international politics dictates that “only
recognized states may make treaties with other states, military, economic or otherwise”
(Coggins, 2008.p.13). Members of the international community, with few exceptions, have
generally responded to these entities in “three main ways: actively opposing them through the
use of embargoes and sanctions; generally ignoring them; and coming to some sort of limited
acceptance of their presence” (Pegg,1998, p. 177). These approaches have proven to be
unsustainable and ineffective, especially in the case of Eurasian aspirant states where Russia has
acted as a patron state expanding its influence. Even in cases where a strong a patron state is
absent, some aspirant states have become hubs for organized crimes, human trafficking, and
illegal international trade (Caspersen, 2008; Hoch, 2001; Lynch, 2002).
Third, another direct result of nonrecognition for aspirant states is their uneven
distribution of resources. Aspirant states allocate a major portion of their budget for military and
security while limiting funds for education and health services. For instance, Somaliland spent
on average 51.1% of its entire government budget on security services from 2002 to 2011. In
2011, Somaliland spent US$42.2 million on security, compared to $5.9 million on education and
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$2.9 million on health (Pegg, 2017, p.7). Bradbury (2008) also emphasizes that security and
defense are a priority for aspirant states because they fear the parent states.
The analysis reveals the importance of recognition both for aspirant states and existing
members of the international community. This study will examine recognition by all the existing
UN member states of ten entities that meet the working definition established for this research.

Organization of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one consists of a brief introduction and
background information on aspirant states, statement of the problem, research questions,
significance of the study, and organization of the thesis. Chapter two reviews the relevant
literature, divided into subsections based on major themes—Definitions and Terminology
addresses definitional ambiguities and concludes with a working definition; International
Recognition reviews various approaches to recognition and arrives at a working definition;
Recognition Decisions: Factors and Motivations evaluates major explanations and motivations
for international recognition; Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses links the hypotheses
derived from the literature review with the existing theories of IR. Chapter three outlines the
research design and methods and operationalization of variables. Chapter four reports results of
the empirical analysis followed by a discussion of results. Chapter five entails conclusion and
avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER 2:
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of existing research about recognition of aspirant
states. Many explanations have been proposed to elucidate what motivates states to extend or
withhold recognition to an aspirant state. Although the literature covers a variety of explanations
for recognition, this review will focus on major explanations that emerge repeatedly throughout
the literature reviewed. This chapter is divided into subsections that proceed as follows.
Definition and Terminology addresses the definitional ambiguity of terms used to refer to nonstate separatist entities and ends with a working definition. International Recognition reviews
different approaches to recognition and arrives at a working definition used for this research.
Recognition Decisions: Factors and Motivations reviews and evaluates major explanations and
motivations for international recognition. The explanations are critically evaluated, synthesized,
and placed into the context of this research. The subsection is followed by an overall conclusion
of the major explanations reviewed. The last subsection, Theoretical Framework and
Hypotheses, links the hypotheses derived from the literature review with the existing theories of
IR.

Definition and Terminology
Sovereign and recognized states remain the primary and central actors in international
politics. There are 193 states with often disputed but fairly stable borders. However, they are not
the sole units in the international system. Political authority, in practice, has been divided among
11

both state and non-state actors. One type of non-state actor is the de facto state – a separatist
polity, such as Somaliland, which displays accoutrements of statehood except for international
legal status, membership in the United Nations, and full or widespread international recognition
(Florea, 2014).
The precise definition and appropriate terminology used to describe non-state separatist
entities is ambiguous in the literature. There is a lack of consensus among scholars over precise
definition of these “secessionist entities that control territory, provide governance, receive
popular support, persist over time, and seek widespread recognition of their proclaimed
sovereignty and yet fail to receive it” (Pegg; 2017, p.1). Pegg (1998, p. 26) defined these nonstate actors as “de facto states” that is an “organized political leadership which has risen to power
through some degree of indigenous capability”. Pegg (1998) further elaborates that these entities
are capable of exercising legislative, executive, and judicial powers over their territories and
populations, but lack international recognition, or are recognized by a limited number of states.
Based on Pegg’s criteria, there are currently eight entities considered de facto states: Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Northern Cyprus, Taiwan, Western Sahara, and
Somaliland (Kolsto, 2006; Caspersen, 2008b; Berg and Toomla, 2009). Florea (2014) reports the
existence of 34 of such entities between 1945 and 2011. Florea (2014) considers an entity a de
facto state if:
It belongs to (or administrated by) a recognized country, but is not a colonial possession.
Seeks some degree of separation from that country and has declared independence (or has
demonstrated aspirations for independence, for example, through a referendum or a
‘sovereignty declaration’). Exerts military control over a territory or portions of territory
inhabited by a permanent population. It is not sanction by the government. Performs at
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least basic governance functions (provision of social and political order). Lacks
international legal sovereignty. And exists for at least 24 months. (p. 791-792)

Kolossov and O’Loughlin (1999) and Kolossov (2001) use the term “pseudo-state” to
describe separatist entities capable of exercising monopoly over the use of violence in a defined
territory that lack universal recognition. Pseudo states, they prescribe, despite having declared
independence and fulfilling empirical criteria of statehood, are “islands of transitional” or
“incomplete statehood” with low levels or absence of international recognition (Kolossov and
O’Loughlin; 1999, p. 151, Kolossov; 2001, p. 87). A number of scholars use the term “quasistates” (Kolstø; 2006, Jackson; 1990) to define state-like actors. Jackson (1990) argues that
entities continue to exist because of marginal support of a patron state and occasional protection
of international law, for instance control over a specific territory based on the self-determination
principle, which are at risk of consumption by stronger sovereign units.
Kolstø’s (2006) definition includes entities that meet domestic requirements of statehood,
but lack external sovereignty. Kolstø (2006) acknowledges that other terms such as “de facto
states”, “unrecognized states”, “para-states” and “pseudo-states” have also been used to describe
his conceptualization of the non-state phenomenon – the “quasi-state” (Kolstø; 2006, p. 725).
Kolossov and O’Loughlin (1999) also use the term to refer to state-like entities that
perform some state functions, but are marred by criminal activities and are, at times, run by
barons or drug mafias. Rywkin (2006) uses quasi-state as an umbrella term for states that
emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union that failed to achieve full statehood. Camyar
(2005) defines “‘quasi-states’ as strong in internal territoriality and empirical statehood, but
weak in external territoriality and juridical statehood (Camyar; 2005, p.1-3).
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Stanislawski (2008) provides a wider definition of the quasi-state with an emphasis on
both juridical–international recognition–and factual statehood–control over territory and
effective government. Stanislawski’s (2008) quasi-state is variegated. Some quasi-states are “asif-states” because they “enjoy international recognition and the rights and duties of states, but in
effect, their internal power and control is limited or fragmented, non-existent”. On the other
hand, “‘almost-states’ are ‘quasi-states’ that do not enjoy international recognition, but contrary
to ‘as-if states’ they are characterized by efficient internal control of their territories and
populations” (Stanislawski; 2008, p.366-368). Stanislawski (2008) introduces another category
called “black spots” that lack both juridical and factual statehood requirements. “Black spots” are
places that are neither under control of an existing government nor a secessionist entity that
aspires to gain international recognition. Black spots “represent territories in which and from
which both transnational organized crime (TOC) and terrorism operate, often becoming criminalterrorist entities” (Stanislawski, 2008; p. 360-367).
Charles King (2001) while analyzing state-building processes in the post-Soviet republics
defines non-state separatist entities as “state-like”, “de facto countries”, “unrecognized states”,
and “quasi-states”. He concludes that these entities, notwithstanding the variegated terms used to
describe them, have a functioning government, a specific territory but “without the imprimatur of
international recognition” (King; 2001, p.525-528).
Kingston and Spears (2004) expand the de facto state definition prescribed in the
literature, like that of Pegg (1998) and Florea (2014), and use the term “states-within-states”—
non-state entities that have the “capacity to control defined pieces of territory, collect taxes, and
conduct business with international and transitional actors” (Kingston and Spears; 2004, p.2)—as
an umbrella term to define both de facto states and a wider range of entities. Their definition
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includes entities that have declared independence and aspire to reach full statehood and militia
groups that operate within borders of weak states.
Geldenhuys (2009, p.1), while admitting the validity of the term “de facto state”, uses
“contested states” to describe secessionist movements that disengaged from their parent states,
formed violable autonomous governments on their specific territory, and lack international
recognition and membership of the United Nations. The defining features of “contested states”
are their “internationally disputed nature of the purported statehood, manifested in their lack of
de jure recognition” and that “their very right of statehood is challenged by the international
community, resulting in no formal recognition at all or recognition by only a small number of
established states” (p.7). These “aspirant states”, another term Geldenhuys uses, “experience
collective non-recognition in the sense of being deliberately excluded from UN membership”
(Geldenhuys; 2009, p. 7). The “contested state” definition is complemented by a temporal
condition. The entity must have “a purportedly independent state for at least three years, desiring
to be treated as a peer by confirmed states” (Geldenhuys; 2009, p. 4). Geldenhuys (2009) argues
that his conceptualization renders these entities as sovereign and confirmed states excluding
widespread recognition which leads to the “formal birth certificate of confirmed statehood,
namely full UN membership” (Geldenhuys, 2009, p. 25). Entities that qualify for designation of
contested states are “Abkhazia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Kosovo, Somaliland, Palestine,
Northern Cyprus, Western Sahara and Taiwan”, and “South Ossetia” (Geldenhuys; 2009, p. 2).
Mirilovic and Siroky (2015;2016), like Geldenhuys, uses the label “aspirant states” to define
secessionist entities that satisfy empirical and juridical requirements of statehood whose external
sovereignty is contested due to a lack of or limited international recognition. Their
conceptualization includes cases like entities such as “Palestine, Israel” and “Abkhazia, Crimea,
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Kosovo, Taiwan, and Western Sahara” among others (Mirilovic and Siroky, 2015, p.264-265).
Berg and Pegg (2016) also use the term “aspirant” to define states that meet the basic
requirement of statehood and are seeking external sovereignty through recognition.
Another prevalent term used to describe de facto entities is “unrecognized states”
(Caspersen; 2012, Cooley and Mitchell; 2010). Affirming and building on Pegg’s (1998)
definition of the de facto states, Caspersen (2012) adds some additional aspects to the
conceptualization of de facto states. The criteria for unrecognized states are: A) an unrecognized
state has achieved de facto independence, covering at last two-thirds of the territory to which it
lays claim and includes its main city and key regions; B) its leadership is seeking to build further
state institutions and demonstrates its own legitimacy; C) the entity has declared formal
independence or demonstrated clear aspirations for independence, for example through an
independence referendum, adoption of a currency, or similar act that clearly signals separate
statehood; D) the entity has not gained international recognition or has, at the most, been
recognized by its patron state and a few other states of no great importance; E) it has existed for
at least two years (Caspersen; 2012, Caspersen; 2009, Pegg;1998).
DeLiosle (2002) uses “near-state” to describe a polity that “fail[s] to satisfy one of the
elements of the statehood reflected in the 1933 Montevideo Convention” (DeLiosle; 2002, p.
741). The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in Article 1 defines
states in the following way: “The state as a person of international law should possess the
following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and
(d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states” (Stanislawski; 2008, p.366-367). Though
international recognition is not among the elements included in the Montevideo Convention,
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DeLiosle (2002) implies lack of recognition curtails the materialization of the last requirement –
capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Toomla (2014) analyzes the different definitions and labels for de facto states such as de
facto states” (Pegg, 1998; Lynch, 2004; Bartmann, 2004), contested states (Geldenhuys; 2009),
unrecognized states (Caspersen (2012), quasi-states (Kolstø; 2006), pseudo-states (Kolossov and
O’Loughlin; 1999), states-within-states (Spears; 2004), and state-like entities (King; 2001)
(Toomla; 2014, p.47). His comparison of these definitions and labels reveals the common themes
used by the authors which are also prevalent in the literature. These include “territory, population
government, and capabilities for international relations, and absence of recognition, legitimacy or
some indigenous capacity for existing – popular support, temporal criterion – some threshold in
years that must be exceeded in de facto states’ existence, declaration of independence or some
other statement of intent” (Toomla; 2014, p.48). Toomla (2014) ends his analysis of the various
definitions and terms with a working definition. The definition involves both “sovereignty –
internal and external; empirical and judicial” elements of statehood (Toomla; 2014, p.57), and
the consensus in the literature. Thus, he defines a de facto state as “state that fulfils all the criteria
set in the Montevideo Convention but lacks sufficient recognition from fellow states” (Toomla;
2014, p.58). This definition consists of “two dimensions of statehood, juridical and empirical.
The former is formal recognition by other countries, with the threshold being enough recognition
to pass a vote for UN membership” (Toomla; 2014, p.58). Toomla (2014) uses Abkhazia,
Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, Palestine, Taiwan, Transnistria, South Ossetia,
Somaliland, and Western Sahara as cases that qualify and appropriately meet his definitional
criteria.
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Some scholars question whether using the term “state” is appropriate while referring to
these entities regardless of what suffixes or prefixes are added. Yemelianova, for example,
argues that international law, under the constitutive theory of recognition, “requires a state’s
recognition by other states as the essential condition of its sovereignty. Therefore, it
delegitimizes the term ‘de facto state’ on the grounds that an entity lacking international
recognition could not be regarded as a state and a subject of international law” (2015, p.221).
Similarly, Crawford (2007) citing constitutive theory of recognition and international law argues
that “there is no such thing as a de facto State” (2007, p. 464) irrespective of what adjective or
modifier is added. Coggins (2014) also sides with Crawford in objecting to use of the term
‘state’, arguing that “without recognition, those actors may be many things: secessionists,
liberation movements, insurgents, anti-colonialists, terrorists, ethnic rebels, or indigenous
peoples, but they may not be states” (2014, p. 27). However, a wide majority of scholars
studying de facto states justify using the term “state” because these entities “satisfy the basic,
formal requirements of statehood in international law save for recognition, they aspire to
confirmed statehood, and they in many ways act like typical states” (Geldenhuys; 2009, p. 26).
Despite various forms of progress in the study of de facto states, the field still remains
persistently mired in controversy over precise definition and terminology. In addition to the
definitions and terms reviewed so far, there is a number of other alternative terms used for de
facto states’ conceptualization by Pegg (2017) – “secessionist entities that control territory,
provide governance, secure popular support, and aspire to widely recognized sovereign statehood
and yet fail to attain it” (2017, p.19). Isachenk (2012) uses “informal states”, Wood (2010)
introduced “limbo states”, and others’ preferred terms include “phantom state” (Byman and
King, 2012), and “proto-state” (Coggin, 2014).
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Despite her past reservations, Caspersen’s (2016) adoption of the term “de facto state”
was considered an effort to end the controversy and promote it as “the most appropriate and most
neutral” (O’Loughlin et al., 2011, p. 2) as well as the “least inaccurate and least offensive”
(Broers, 2013, p. 69), the controversy remains unresolved.
The division over the precise definition and terminology continues. However, there is a
“coalescing around three main terms: contested states (e.g., Geldenhuys, 2009; Ker Lindsay,
2012; Kyris, 2015), unrecognized states (e.g., Caspersen, 2012; Richards, 2014; Richards &
Smith, 2015), and de facto states” (e.g., Bahcheli, Bartmann, & Srebnik, 2004; Berg, 2013;
Broers, 2013; Florea, 2014; Johnson & Smaker, 2014; Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2012; Lynch, 2004;
MacQueen, 2015; O’Loughlin et al., 2011; Pegg, 1998; Popescu, 2007; Voller, 2013;
Yemelianova, 2015) (Pegg, 2017,19). The division among scholars over definition and
terminology has not helped the understanding of these entities. The controversy does not seem to
end in the near future. Though there is a proliferation in the use of diverse terminology and
definition, Pegg argues that most authors studying the phenomenon refer “to essentially the same
things” (2017, p.20) and broadly accept Toomla’s (2016) conceptualization of de facto states as
“entities that fulfil the Montevideo criteria for statehood but lack international recognition”
(Toomla, 2016, p.331). The conceptualization of these entities is disputed. There are examples of
secessionist entities that fall under two or three definitions. For example, table: 1.1 summarizes
the different entities related to the various conceptual definitions.
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Table 1:0:1 Different Conceptions of Non-State Entities
De Facto States
(Pegg,1998)

Contested States
(Geldenhuys)

De Facto States
(Toomla,2014)

Aspiring States

Abkhazia
NagornoKarabakh
Northern Cyprus

Abkhazia
Kosovo

Abkhazia
Kosovo

Abkhazia
Kosovo

Aspiring States
(Mirilovic and
Siroky,
2014,2015;
Geldenhuys,2009)
Abkhazia
Kosovo

NagornoKarabakh
Northern Cyprus
Palestine
Taiwan
Transnistria
South Ossetia
Somaliland
Western Sahara

Nagorno-Karabakh

NagornoKarabakh
Northern Cyprus
Palestine
Taiwan
Transnistria
South Ossetia
Somaliland
Western Sahara

NagornoKarabakh
Northern Cyprus
Palestine
Taiwan
Transnistria
South Ossetia
Somaliland
Western Sahara

Somaliland
South Ossetia
Taiwan
Transnistria
Western Sahara

Northern Cyprus
Palestine
Taiwan
Transnistria
South Ossetia
Somaliland
Western Sahara

Two conclusions can be drawn from the literature review about definitions and
terminologies. First, despite improvements in the overall understanding and dynamics of these
non-state polities, the controversy over the use of the appropriate terms has not been resolved.
The myriad of different labels amalgamates into three broad terms: ‘contested states’,
‘unrecognized states’, and ‘de facto states’. With few exceptions, almost all scholars combine the
term state with a prefix of their choice. This unsettled area allows researchers and scholars to
pick the term of their choosing with due justification while studying these phenomena. Second,
the definitions are narrowing, and the concept stretching is contained. As Pegg (2017) points out
most scholars of the subfield are broadly talking about the same thing and accept Toomla’s
(2014, 2016) definition. With this view in mind and to avoid confusion, the term “aspirant”
(Berg and Pegg, 2016; Geldenhuys, 2009; Mirilovic and Siroky, 2015, 2016) can be combined
with the term state, thus creating ‘aspirant state’. The term ‘aspirant state’ encompasses polities
that meet the conceptualizations by Toomla (2014; 2016), Berg and Pegg (2016), Geldenhuys
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(2009), and Mirilovic and Siroky (2015; 2016). Therefore, from the analysis of different
definitions and terms, a working definition can be formed for aspirant states. An aspirant state is
a recognition-seeking separatist polity that has managed to break away from its parent state and
meets the Montevideo Convention criteria for statehood – (1) a permanent population; (2) a
defined territory; (3) a government; and (4) capacity to enter into relations with the other states –
that is unrecognized or partially recognized. This definition of aspirant state denotes two things.
First, the entities meet the four criteria for statehood as enumerated in the Montevideo
Convention, and are partially recognized or unrecognized. Second, all these entities aspire to
become externally sovereign, internationally confirmed, and eventually admitted to the UN as
full members. Thus, the term aspirant state captures all these aspects.
Based on this working definition, an aspirant state is operationally defined as a
secessionist entity that has a number of characteristics, which include: 1) Meet the four criteria of
Montevideo Convention; A) a permanent population, B) a defined territory, C) government, and
D) capacity to enter into relations with other states. 2) The entity has declared independence and
intent to separate from home state. 3) The movement must last at least two years. 4) It is a
recognition-seeking entity that has gained none or partial recognition. This operationalization is
not original. It is a combination of the operationalization employed by Coggins (2014) and
Toomla (2014) except the two characteristics – recognition-seeking entity and existence for two
years – which have been included for this study. The two elements are added to complement the
already existing operationalization for two reasons. First, in order to limit the number of cases.
The spatial and temporal parameters of Toomla (2014) and Coggins (2014) are vast covering a
large number of cases over several decades. For example, Coggins’ (2014) study includes small
secessionist cases and former colonies. Some of which have existed for twenty-four hours to a
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few weeks in the twentieth century. Not all her cases are recognition-seeking entities. Second,
the literature proposes a minimum of two years of existence for a secessionist entity in order to
establish juridical and empirical basis of statehood that serve as the main components for
satisfying the Montevideo requirement for statehood (Caspersen, 2012, 2016; Pegg, 1998).
This research will study cases that meet the working definition of an aspirant state as
operationalized above. The entities meeting the working definition are Abkhazia, Kosovo,
Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, Palestine, Taiwan, Transnistria, South Ossetia,
Somaliland, and Western Sahara. This research will cross examine the recognition decisions of
UN member states against these ten cases. The research design chapter will cover the
methodological discussion of case selection and provide detailed justification for why and how
the ten entities meet the working definition of aspirant states. The same section will also provide
background information about each of the ten cases. The following subsection covers the
different approaches and practices to international recognition and proposes a working definition
for international recognition used in this research.

International Recognition
The concept of recognition, much like de facto state, is somewhat disputed in the
literature because of its multidimensionality crossing-cutting different disciplines. There is no
agreement over the precise definition of recognition. The concept is variegated connoting
different meanings. Its complexity arises from the fact that the concept entails a combination of
politics, national and international law, formal and informal practices of recognition (Kelsen,
1941). One reason it is difficult to “resolve the controversy over state recognition theory is
because the international legal system translates political controversies into legal questions that
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can then be addressed through legal means”, and therefore, raise the question over the entity’s
“nature of statehood [and the] degree of discretion that states have in acting on the international
plane” (Worster, 2009, p.116).
Some scholars count three reasons why recognition is controversial in the literature.
These include: 1) Recognition is a question of politics rather than law as demonstrated by the
practice and foreign policy of states. States make recognition decisions based on their national
interests using legal principles as camouflage for political decisions. 2) Recognition, in form and
substance, for the most part is a unilateral diplomatic act. There is no collective procedure for
conferring recognition based on established legal principles. 3) The variegated nature of
recognition; recognition of a new state, a new government, and a belligerency. There is also de
jure, de facto, conditional, implied, or implicit and explicit or express recognition. Each of these
belong to different legal principles and entail various legal consequences (Bledsoe and Boczek,
1987; Bahcheli and Srebrink, 2004, Högger, 2015; Stinson, 1924).
International recognition is disputed in international law. It is dominated by two
competing theories of state recognition, declaratory and constitutive theories (Badescu, 2016).
According to the declaratory theory, an entity becomes state upon satisfying the four empirical
criteria established by the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.
These include (1) permanent population, (2) a defined territory, (3) government, and (4) capacity
to enter into relations with other states (Badescu, 2016). Declaratory theory is built on the
objective criteria outlined in the Montevideo Convention. when all the conditions are met,
statehood is recognized regardless of the international community’s approval or disapproval.
According to the declaratory, recognition is almost irrelevant because the status of statehood is
based on facts and not on individual state discretion; if statehood is a fact, it follows that
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recognition should be automatic (Eckert, 2002). Constitutive theory argues that it is only by
recognition of other sovereign states that an entity can become a state and gain international
legitimacy. This theory challenges the Montevideo Convention in that an entity does not need to
meet factual requirements, but rather the entity automatically gains membership into the
international community through recognition by other states that ultimately allow an entity to
become a state and gain international legitimacy (Baldwin, 2009).
Grant (1999) and Van (2014) argue that the constitutive theory is problematic because it
attributes a political rather than a legal character to recognition. There is no prescribed process
for an entity to follow to formally gain recognition and international legitimacy as a state.
However, the UN, the International Court of Justice, and their member states have accepted that,
as customary international law, there is a set of criteria established in the Montevideo
Convention articles, which an entity must meet in order to claim self-determination and gain
formal recognition by international community (Crawford, 2006; Coggins, 2008).
Notwithstanding the controversial and complex nature of the concept, it is worth
reviewing the major definitions that enjoy a degree of consensus among scholars. The institute of
international law has defined recognition “as the free act by which one or more states
acknowledge the existence on a definite territory of a human society which is politically
organized, independent of any other existing state, and capable of observing the obligation of
international law”, which has a wider acceptance among scholars of international law (Institut De
Droit International, 185). Formal recognition results from either explicit declaration or from
an implicit action based on political considerations, such as the establishment of diplomatic
relations with the new state. This can be full or conditional recognition (Brown, 1936, p.689694).
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The practice of states draws a distinction between de jure and de facto recognition which
usually takes place on the basis of political realities and consideration of national interests.
Recognition de jure means that according to the recognizing state, the state or government
recognized formally fulfils the requirement laid down by international law, for instance the
Montevideo Convention’s criteria of statehood, for effective participation in the international
community. Additional aspects of the de jure recognition include a formal and explicit
acceptance of the existence of a state by the international legal and political community, usually
embodied by the exchange of ambassadors. De facto recognition on the other hand, means that in
the opinion of the recognizing state, provisionally and temporarily and with all due reservation
for the future, the state or government recognized fulfils the above requirement in fact. De facto
recognition is provisional and temporary and could be withdrawn in the future. However, it is
usually, not always, followed by de jure recognition (Brownlie, 2010, p.91-92; Boas, 2013;
Delaney, 2008; Shaw, 2017).
The strict distinctions about various kind of recognition and their subsequent legal
consequences is primarily a debated topic for legal scholars; for example, Brownlie (2010), Boas
(2013), Shaw (2017), Lauterpach (1947), Rich (1993), Chen (1951, and Ben Bot (1968). The
literature is weak or limited on categorization of political recognition. From a political point of
view, recognition of a state or government “means that the recognizing state is willing to enter
into political and other relations with the recognized state or government, relations of the kind
which normally exist between members of the family of nations”, through “a unilateral
declaration of the recognizing state, or by a bilateral transaction, namely, by an exchange of
notes between the government of the recognizing state, on the one hand, and the government of
the recognized state or the recognized government on the other” (Kelsen, 1941, p. 605).
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There is inconsistency over precise definition of recognition due to interlacing of
different disciplines. Ryan Griffith captures all major elements of the various disciplines in his
definition of international recognition as “a body of evolving norms, rules, and practices that
determines which claimants can become independent states” (2018, p.80). Dozer (1966)
synchronizes the various aspects of recognition in his definition. In the broadest technical and
historical sense, “recognition in international relations refers to the acknowledgment by a nation
of any change in a situation in a foreign country.” He further explains that recognition is “an
attribute of sovereignty by which a nation, government, or people fixes its relations with other
nations, governments, and peoples, thus establishing or reestablishing a legal continuity which
has, for one reason or another, been broken.” Such a practice he suggests is “to the recognition of
new states, the recognition of belligerency or insurgency, and the recognition of new
governments” (Dozer, 1966, p.1).
However, the general practical conceptualization of recognition, notwithstanding its
controversial nature among different academic disciplines, as exhibited in the foreign policy
decisions of states, is as follows. It refers to “a discretionary unilateral act exercised by the
government of a state officially acknowledging the existence of another state, government, or
belligerency” (Bledsoe and Boczek, 1987, p. 44-45), which can take place through an explicit
declaration or implicit action as well as in a formal or informal manner. This conceptualization
of the practice of international recognition best captures different understanding and components
of the concept. It will be employed as the definitional framework throughout this study.
The following section reviews and evaluates the major explanations and reasons that
motivate states to extend or withhold recognition.
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Recognition Decisions: Factors and Motivations
The literature provides a diverse range of states’ motivations to extend or withhold
recognition to an aspirant state. Though this study focuses on examining the recognition of ten
cases by all UN member states, the literature viewed is not specific to the selected cases. Instead,
the purpose of this review is to examine and summarize the existing explanations and factors
behind recognition decisions in general unrestricted to the cases. The factors and explanations
are grouped into smaller subsections for clarity and organization purposes. The first group of
factors is recognition in the legal and normative contexts.

International law and normative explanations
One of the prevailing approaches on recognition in the literature is its position in the
context of international legal system. Krasner (1999) maintains that recognition and external
sovereignty is and ought to be granted to aspirant states on the legal basis instead of political
reasons. Proponents of the declaratory theory of recognition suggest that an entity automatically
becomes a sovereign state upon meeting the criteria of statehood established in the Montevideo
Convention and abiding by the international legal standards. For them, recognition by existing
members of the system should follow automatically when these conditions are met. These
scholars present a normative understanding of recognition and focus on dynamics of the
sovereign states and entities that actively seek international recognition and how such dynamics
are placed in the context of international law (Tanisha Fazal, 2008,2014; Frances Boyle,1990;
Joel Migdal, 2001, Stanford Silverberg,1998; Stephen Krasner,1999). They, however, are weak
on examining the motivations and reasons behind why states recognize some aspirants and avoid
extending recognition to others.
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Fabry (2010) also places recognition of new states in a normative context. His analysis of
the practice of recognition covers several centuries beginning with recognition of the United
States by France and ends with the Post-Cold War period. Fabry suggests that “de facto
recognition” as practiced by “the United States and the United Kingdom in the 19th century”
(Fabry, 2010, p.219-221) is the only viable method to be practiced by states while considering
recognition decision. Fabry advocates the de facto recognition doctrine based on which states do
not interfere in the domestic affairs of others and let people determine their own destiny, through
peace or war, and the winner should be recognized. He further suggests that if a state is divided
into separate entities through peaceful or armed confrontation, it incumbent upon other states in
the system to respect the outcome and recognize all the new polities.
Scholars preoccupied with international law and normative approaches to recognition
admit that ultimately politics take precedent over legal principles (Rich, 1993; Silverberg, 1998).
Over half a century ago, Lauterbach (1944, p.386-387) argued that the act of recognition is not a
matter governed by law, but a question of policy where factors based on political realities take
preference than legal principles. His argument still holds true. A significant plurality of
international law scholars posits that recognition is an optional and discretionary political
decision, mostly individual and unique to each state lacking uniformity, taken not in obedience to
a legal duty, but in pursuance of the exigencies of national interests. As such, recognition
decisions, for the most part, do not fit an established and generalizable pattern that would carry
enough explanatory value capable of predictability and consistency (Crawford, 2006;
Freudenschuss, 1982, Lauterbach, 1947; Portman, 2010; Rich,1993; Saganek, 2016).
Rich (1993) examined the recognition of new states that emerged following the collapse
of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the ones seceding from the Socialist Federal
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Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). His study shows that recognition was conferred to the new
states on individual basis at the discretion of the recognizer states. However, the European
Community (EC) adopted a unified policy, which is the only time a collective decision
representing several countries was made regarding recognition. The EC policy guidelines in
addition to traditional requirements for statehood included new conditions. These include
requiring states to “have constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the
appropriate international obligations and have committed themselves in good faith to a peaceful
process and to negotiations”. Moreover, the guidelines were only applicable to the Baltic states
not all the new emerging states, which demonstrates that the EC’s policy was calculated based
both on “the normal standards of international practice and the political realities in each case”
(Hannum, 1993, p.61-63). Rich (1993) ends his study of some twenty new states emerging from
the implosion of USSR and SFRY with the following conclusion:
[R]cognition of states has become less predictable and more a matter of political
discretion... The traditional criteria for statehood retain an uneasy existence alongside the
new EC Guidelines, which have been particularly influential in relation to the recognition
of the new states emerging from the USSR and Yugoslavia…Membership of the UN has
also been seen differently by different countries insofar as a vote in favor may amount to
recognition. It now seems that the 'political realities' have gained primacy over the
inclinations to maintain consistency by applying accepted criteria to test the fact of
statehood. (p.63-65).

One of the long standing international law principles requires states to respect the
sovereignty of other states including their independence and territorial integrity. However, this
notion is challenged by the “self-determination” principle. Self-determination is a recent
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phenomenon, emerging in the aftermath of World War I that responds to demands of national
groups seeking to divide territory. Support for the principle increased as it was outlined in
Chapter I, Article I and in Chapter 9, Article 55 of the United Nations Charter (Whitehall, 2016).
The principle of self-determination to a right, “especially after the 1960 UN Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples, when the term came to denote decolonization.
However, self-determination applied to territories and not to peoples” (Carley, 1996, p.1).
This principle is sometimes invoked by aspirant states while attempting to gain international
recognition. The parent or home states, from which secessionist states seek separation, challenge
the principle with the longstanding principle of international law – the territorial integrity. The
self-determination doctrine has not received much support among statesmen and scholars as a
basis for creation of new states and their international recognition due to its vague nature and
complex applicability as well as a lack of enforcing mechanism in the international system.
Gunter (1979) studied the reasons behind UN’s unwillingness and failure to uphold its norms of
self-determination and territorial integrity in the cases of Western Sahara, Belize, Falklands,
Gibraltar, and East Timor. He concludes that unclarity in the terms of these norms, “the weak
voting power of the Third World majority” in the UN, and the “sheer military power of the norm
breakers” (Gunter, 1979, p.231) explain the failure of the UN to appropriately apply its
established norms. Other scholars argue the principle had a specific temporal importance.
Griffiths (2018) also address the competing narratives of the two norms that affect the
international recognition regime. Griffiths much like Gunter (1979) maintains that it is the states
who decide which norms matter. As he puts it “One norm implies that borders should not be
changed; the other implies that stateless nations should be able to change them. The resulting
efforts to balance these competing demands can be summed up by the question: who counts?
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Who counts for the fullest expression of self-determination, and who does not? Answering that
question is complicated by the fact that nations are fuzzy, overlapping, and protean categories”
(Griffiths, 2018, p.80).
Hannum (1990) for example maintains that self-determination was a more appealing
norm to support decolonization following the end of World War II. Carley (1996) summarizes
the applicability and characteristics of the principle in four ways: “First, self-determination
referred only to decolonization. Second, it did not apply to peoples but to territories. Third, selfdetermination was now considered an absolute right—though, again, for colonies only; this
marked a significant change from the previous era. Finally, self-determination did not allow for
secession; instead, the territorial integrity of existing states and most colonial territories was
assumed” (1996, p.4). Mörkenstam (2015) argues that the principle can be invoked while
determining domestic policies regarding rights of minorities and indigenous people and their
territories. Many scholars agree that hundreds of new nations can come into existence because of
racial, linguistic, ethnic, religious, ideational, and territorial indemnifications if selfdetermination is considered the foundation for statehood (Binder and Crossett, 1993; Gellner,
1993; Hannum, 1990). Thus, the validity of self-determination is debated and often confronted
with the legal principle of territorial integrity.
There are a few doctrines that are invoked, at least in a historical context, when the issue
of international recognition is at stake both by scholars and statesmen. Tabor or Woodrow
Wilson principle, also alternatively called the Tabor Doctrine, is one of them. This principle was
formulated at the suggestion of Ecuador’s foreign minister, Tabor, in a treaty of the Central
American Republics in 1907. The doctrine suggests that states should not extend recognition to
governments and states established as result of coup d’état, civil war, or any other forms of
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internal violence until people, through their representatives, have organized a constitutional
government (Peterson, 2002). Another similar principle is the Stimson Doctrine established in
1930s, which is a policy of nonrecognition. This U.S. policy established in 1932, elaborated
through a note to the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China, declares that states created as
result of aggression, international territorial changes by force, and annexations are subject to
none-recognition. This policy was also invoked when the Soviet Union annexed the Balletic
states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Turns, 2003).
The Estrada Doctrine posits a counter argument presented in the Tabor and Stimson
doctrines. The doctrine, named after Genaro Estrada the foreign minister of Mexico, was
enunciated by Mexico in 1930 and remained the core of Mexico’s foreign policy until the year
2000. A few other countries, mainly in Latin America, adopted its proposition. The doctrine
suggests that a recognition decision of states would not be made in case of regime changes inside
a state. Instead the recognizer state would confine themselves to the maintenance or withdrawal,
as they may deem advisable, of their diplomatic agents. The recognizer will accept whatever
government is in effective control without raising the issue of recognition. This policy is
grounded in the principles of nonintervention, self-determination of all nations, and peaceful
resolution of disputes. It focused on recognition of states irrespective of unconstitutional change
in the government of another state (Fernandez, 2009). The doctrine places emphasis on
refraining in domestic affairs of other countries and use of domestic factors to question
international sovereignty. It is evident from the text of the policy announcement where it states
that Mexico will make no “declarations in the sense of grants of recognition, since that nation
considers such a course is an insulting practice and one which, in addition to the fact that it
offends the sovereignty of other nations, implies that judgment of some sort may be passed upon
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the internal affairs of those nations by other governments, inasmuch as the latter assume, in
effect, an attitude of criticism, when they decide, favorably or unfavorably, as to the legal
qualifications of foreign regimes” (Greig, 1991, p. 41-42). The first two doctrines weigh in on
the domestic dynamics or facts on the ground when issuing recognition. They are often
considered as political tools employed through foreign policy of the recognizing states to reach
their political objectives. On the contrary, the Estrada doctrine is a noninterventionist approach
with little to no emphasis on changes in regime and paths undertaken by people to form
governments in a state or territory.
The legal and normative explanations are insufficient in fully uncovering the reasons
behind recognition decisions. The following subsection will review other explanations in the
literature on states’ recognition decisions, which are either less or not at all, grounded in
international law and normative principles.

The systemic level explanations
The literature identities a set of factors, grounded in some broader classical power-based
explanations, namely the role of great powers, external and domestic security concerns, strategic
alliance, and enmity at the international level as important influencing variables behind state’s
recognition decisions. Bridget Coggins has carried out one of the recent systematic studies of
international recognition. Coggins (2011) introduces a model that explains why states choose to
recognize or withhold recognition of secessionist states. Her model heavily focuses on the
significant role of the great powers in the system. She likens the practice of state recognition to a
social club membership. Admission to the club depends on collective decisions of the members,
especially the key members – great powers – that she calls “friends in high places” (Coggins,
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2011, p. 435). Coggins’s model suggests states recognition decisions are based on their parochial
political concerns, which she divides into three broad categories. First is geostrategic and
external security. The core of this category of factors includes “strategy, alliance, and enmity”
(Coggins, 2014, p. 45) and how “considerations of international security environment and the
effect that new international participants is anticipated to have on the status quo” (Coggins, 2014,
p.46). She further elaborates that when states think recognition of a new state will “weaken their
enemies, strengthen themselves and their friends, or otherwise generate positive security
consequences, they will more likely prefer its independence” if otherwise, they will withhold
recognition (Coggins, 2018, p. 29).
Second is domestic security alternatively referred to as vulnerability (Coggins, 2014, p.
46). Recognition of a secessionist abroad will encourage domestic secessionist movements.
States take into consideration secessionist movements inside their borders when making
recognition decisions. Third is “systematic stability” that should make great powers “prefer to
coordinate their recognition whenever possible” (Coggins, 2014, p.47). If great powers
coordinate their recognition decision, a wide spread recognition is likely to follow, and the new
state’s external sovereignty is secured, because great powers play a pivotal role in swaying
international opinion and behavior. On the other hand, if great powers disagree, it is likely that
that status quo or non-recognition will be maintained. When great powers agree that recognition
is appropriate new states, with a few exceptions, emerge and reach statehood while disagreement
leaves the fate of the new states in a continued controversial status (Coggins, 2001, 449-450).
The vulnerability concept in addition to its strict security dimension is linked to other
areas of domestic politics and foreign policy of the recognizing states; great powers and the rest.
National security that encompasses several areas including self-preservation are other areas
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affected by the recognizer’s recognition decisions (Coggins, 2011, 2014; Sideman, 2001;
Treisman, 1997). The vulnerability proposition posits that states facing domestic secessionist
movements do not risk their own security and territorial integrity by extending recognition to
another aspirant state. This can embolden separatist movements in the vulnerable countries,
which the recognizer states cannot afford and or are unwilling to commit such a risk (Ayoob,
1995; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Herbst, 1989; Touval, 1972).
The logic applies both to small and greater states. Coggins (2011) maintains that politics
of recognition is heavily influenced by the logic of the vulnerability among great powers,
especially when the domestic security of the recognizer is directly affected by its foreign policy
decisions towards aspirant states. Bucheit (1978, p.103) argues that the vulnerability factor is
especially acute among weak states with domestic threats of secession where “even the slightest
recognition of secession…would be as unwise as showing blood in the lion’s cage”. The
vulnerability proposition explains why states with domestic separatist movements like Spain
avoid extending recognition to aspirant states for example Kosovo and Palestine (Hill and Jewett,
1994). Some Scholars challenge the vulnerability explanation. Sideman (1997) and Lewis (2002)
demonstrate through empirical studies that several states in Africa and even major powers like
Russia, facing internal separatist movements, have actively supported separatist movements, and
recognized aspirant states like Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Laitan and Samatar, 1987).
Several other scholars provide similar arguments to that of Coggins (2011; 2014; 2018)
about the motives behind recognition decisions. Great powers and occasionally regional powers
are decisive players who can influence whether to extend or withhold recognition (Coggins 2011,
Ker-Lindsay 2012, Sterio 2012). Mikulas Fabry (2012) and Savo Heleta (2014) contend that
recognition of a secessionist state by a great power ensures whether a secessionist state will be
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successful in reaching one of its vital goal – external sovereignty and full statehood – or not,
which is essential for survival of a state. Sterio (2012) maintains that secession and international
recognition are nearly impossible without the support and backing of a powerful patron state. For
instance, regional and international governments provided Kosovo and South Sudan with the
diplomatic support, in the form of recognition, necessary for statehood. In the case of Kosovo, it
also received extensive economic, military, and administrative support on its way to
independence. A patron state does not necessarily have to be a great power, it can be a regional
or even an ordinary state in terms of regional and global status and influence. A patron state is
usually an internationally recognized and sovereign state that provides political, economic,
military, and diplomatic support to a de facto state. Support of a patron state, with few
exceptions, generally an essential component for survivability of a secessionist entity (Debski et
al. 2017, p.3). Recognition by a great power to a degree legitimatizes the claims of aspirant states
and such a recognition can prevent home states from reversing the aspirant states’ progress in
seceding from the home state (Ayoob, 1995; Krasner, 1999; Mayall, 1999). Moreover,
recognition by a great power, in addition to its diplomatic and political weight in the
international system, carries practical advantages as well. Recognition of a secessionist state by a
great power implies that it is willing to provide economic and diplomatic assistance to ensure the
survival of the aspirant state (Batta, Case, and Shiveley, 2010; Peterson, 1982).
As mentioned earlier, Coggins (2014) examined recognition of secessionist states by
great powers from 1931 to 2002 and concluded that three factors determine great powers
decision-making regarding recognizing secessionist states. She further argues that great powers
can provide a critical mass of support for the aspiring states in the system, influence collective
decision-making, and decide whether recognition of a secessionist state will affect the
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international system’s security. Similarly, Byman, (2001), Krasner (1999), Jackson and James
(1993) also maintain that great powers play a pivotal role and influence other states ‘recognition
decisions on secessionist state. The great powers’ motivations, they maintain, are usually driven
by geo-strategic objectives, domestic politics, and at times normative norms. They further argue
that the lesser powers in the system follow the great powers decisions for a variety of reasons; to
gain favor with great powers or other reasons, such as the bandwagon effect and balance of
power principles grounded in realpolitik’s power-based explanations of the international system.
Balance of power and dominant political ideologies among great powers and other states
in the system, for example communism and liberal democracies, also affect recognition of
aspirant states. Notwithstanding a few exceptions like Germany’s unilateral recognition of
Croatia and Slovenia, this was a dominant behavior in the international system during the Cold
War era. During this period, recognition of secessionist states was linked to competition between
the United States and the Soviet Union and the states that were allied to both sides, either
through official strategic agreements or through ideological similarities (Crawford, 1996;
Galloway, 1978; Warbrick, 1992). The end of bipolarity in the international system following the
Cold War presents an opportunity to explore and test the explanatory power of factors that are
not directly deriving from power politics and the realist tradition. The post-Cold War era
presents an opportunity to test and explore the role of regime type, identity relations and other
cultural factors and their influence over international recognition of aspirant states.
Although great powers play a significant role in determining the success and failure of
secessionist states’ ambition to become independent states through granting external legitimacy
by means of recognizing them, they do not act uniformly. The variation in great powers’
positions towards secessionist states changes based on major trends in international politics. For
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instance, the United States did not support secessionist movements before the 1990s. It tended to
support secessionist movements after the 1990s and the fall of Soviet Union (Paquin 2007).
Some scholars maintain that the variation in America’s response to secessionist movements after
becoming the sole super power in the system is best explained by “defensive positionalism”
(Paquin 2007, p.3). Based on this logic the United States’ decision to recognize a secessionist
state is driven by its desire to maintain its hegemonic and powerful position in the system, and its
pre-1990 anti-secession position was driven by ideational basis and the bi-polar politics of the
international system (Grieco, 1996; Paquin, 2004; Waltz, 2008). The post-1990s variation to
extend or withhold recognition by the United States can be explained by the fact that the United
States is a stability-seeking state, which affects and influences other states’ decisions regarding
recognition (Rich, 2011).
Though great powers, regional powers, and the hegemon in the system are significant in
the recognition of aspirant states, recognition by small powers is important as well. Recognition
of aspirant states by a substantial number of small powers facilitates aspirant states’ path towards
gaining membership of the United Nations (UN). The UN requires two-thirds support of UN’s
General Assembly in order to admit new members. Thus, both small and great power states
matter (XIV Rule 136). Furthermore, aspiring states’ recognition by small states expands its
external recognition, which then can facilitate treaty making, offer a shield against legal action,
gain membership in key international organizations, and establish diplomatic immunity among
other things (Krasner, 1999; Rich, 2009).
Many scholars purported the significance of recognition by all states, especially small
powers, as it provides an opportunity to examine other broader questions of states’ behavior in
the state. Specifically, empirical examination of recognition by small states can help to
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understand how states balance demands of their allies, domestic and regional constraints, and
their relationship with parent states as well as key international organizations (Ingebritsen, 2006;
Gvalia, Siroky, Lebanidze and Lashvili, 2013; Kissinger 2011). The system level explanations
are major decisive factors in recognition decisions. However, domestic and national politics of
recognizer states also have a significant impact over recognition decisions. The next section
explains the link between domestic politics and recognition of aspirant states.

Domestic and national politics
National politics of recognizer states can influence foreign policy and recognition
decisions. Crawford (1996) studied Germany’s unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.
She argues that domestic politics shape recognition decisions under two conditions. First,
“domestic factors are likely to outweigh external factors in shaping preferences when the issue is
not clearly one of national security”. Second, “domestic politics shape substantive preferences
when a high level of uncertainty surrounds the issue”, such as a lack of clear guidelines for
recognition of new states in the international system, in Germany’s case the EC, and the
ambiguous nature of diplomatic recognition in the international system (Crawford, 1996, p.518).
In a separate article Crawford (1995) discusses how domestic politics in Germany pushed
statesmen to unilaterally recognize Croatia and Slovenia to promote the growing power of
Germany in the international system. Crawford considers the pivotal political pressure from
interest and lobbying groups in Germany that influenced recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.
For instance, the lobbying efforts of Croatians living in Germany and the role of the emissary of
Croatia who had direct contact with the foreign policy advisors of the German government
(Crawford, 1995, p.8-9).
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Crawford’s preceding argument about the influence of interest groups on foreign policy
and recognition decisions in Germany is applicable to other countries as well. Interest groups and
their participation in and influence on national foreign policy, particularly in the United States,
have been largely studied. The various interest groups advocate political, ethnic, racial, religious,
or economic interests. They work to ensure that politicians and government officials see it as part
the national interest and, therefore, affect U.S. Foreign policy. The Armenian American lobby,
the Council on American–Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Cuban-American lobby, and the Israeli
Lobby are among the interest groups that affect American foreign policy at various degrees (Said
1981; Ahrari 1987a; Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush, 2004; Lindsay 2004; Mearsheimer and
Walt, 2007; Kirk 2008; Rubenzer 2008; Vanderbush, 2009; Rubenzer and Redd 2010).
Interest groups play a significant role in American foreign policy. Their role is not as
prevalent in other countries as it is the United States (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999; Shain 1999;
Smith, 2000). The Israel Lobby greatly influences U.S. foreign policy towards Palestine, and the
Palestinians’ aspirations to reach full statehood. The greater political influence of The Israeli
Lobby is one of the main reasons why U.S. refuses to recognize Palestine and vetoes Palestine's
application for statehood in the United Nations Security Council (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007;
Smith, 2000). Ross (2013) studied the foreign policy influence of Muslim interest groups in the
United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. He concludes that their influence has been minor or
non-existent. Especially the influence and advocacy of these interest groups for statehood of
Palestine and Kosovo.
There are several lobbying groups in Russia that affect Russian foreign policy. The
Russian Orthodox Church is among the domestic groups that play a substantial role in
influencing Russian policy. It has advocated the reunification of Eastern Slavic orthodox people,
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advocacy for Russian nationalism, and its role in steering Russian foreign policy in the Balkan
conflict (Marušiak, 2015; Lomagin, 2012; Oganesyan, 2012). The literature on interest groups
affecting foreign policy of other major countries especially international recognition of aspirant
state, members of the United Nations Security Council for example, is weak or non-existent.
Home state also alternatively referred to as the parent state whose territorial integrity is at perils
with an aspirant state separating from it actively engages recognizer states to influence their
recognition decisions. The following section will review how and why home states engage
recognizer states to influence their recognition decision.

The home state factor
Another significant dimension in conjunction with recognition of aspirant states is the
relationship or struggle between the aspirant state and the home or parent state. Home states that
stand to lose territory often lobby other countries to withhold international recognition from the
aspiring state. Home states can deny independence, deploy force if necessary, and most
importantly request the international community to respect its territorial integrity and avoid
recognizing the breakaway region (Griffiths, 2016). Moreover, the debate over the right of selfdetermination and territorial integrity gives home states an advantage because the long tradition
of territorial integrity, established since the Westphalian Peace, tend to take precedence over the
right of self-determination. Home states engage in negotiations with key regional and other
states, small and large powers, to prevent recognition of the secessionist region. Other strategies
of parent states include portraying the secessionist movement as a foreign invasion or
interference. Parent states try to limit secessionist movements’ ability to access and establish
relations with the outside world. Sometimes states, such as the United States, favored the
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position of home states’ demand for respecting their territorial integrity to avoid insecurity and
instability. Many states also fear recognition of secessionist movements will have a domino
effect and lead to disintegration of states whose populace is not homogenous, multiethnic states
for example, and thus create security challenges at the international level and domestic conflicts
inside these states (Fabry, 2010; Ker-Lindsay, 2012a, 2013b; Fazal and Griffiths, 2014; Paquin,
2007; Nye, 2002).
Ker-Lindsay (2018) summarizes the counter-secession strategies of home or parent states
into four interlocking components: 1) maintain claim to territory, which focuses on the persistent
efforts of home states trying “to ensure that the world knows that the attempted secession is
unacceptable” (Ker-Lindsay, 2018, p.87). This is done through several means including a
parliamentary resolution declaring the secession attempts illegal. 2) Prevent recognition, which
involves active diplomatic campaign and lobbing by the home state in the international arena. 3)
Stopping the legitimization of secession through all political and cultural means both inside and
abroad. 4) Pursue legal avenues. A good example is Serbia’s referral of Kosovo’s case to
International Court of Justice (Ker-Landsay, 2018, p.85-89)
The literature does not uniformly support the position that home states are always at an
advantage. In some cases, secessionist movements survive and gain partial recognition through
the help of a patron state. Taiwan, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and NagornoKarabakh managed to reach de facto status with the help and support of the United States,
Turkey, and Armenia, respectively. Patron states’ support for secessionist states varies case by
case and the reasons behind each case differ as well. Sometimes patron states regard secessionist
entities as political instruments to bolster their power in the region, exert pressure over the parent
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state, and generally support by a patron state is grounded in national interests of the recognizer
and or the patron state (Berg and Toomla, 2009; Kolstø, 2007).
Does regime type of a recognizer state matter when invoking the issue of international
recognition? A major categorization of regime type is dividing states into democracies and nondemocracies. The Democratic Peace Theory posits that democracies rarely go to war with one
another and are generally cooperative with one another. The relationship between regime types
and the Democratic Peace Theory and it effect on recognition decision is discussed in the
following section.

Democratic peace theory
The literature on democratic peace theory focuses on the role of political regime types in
explaining international events; more generally that jointly democratic dyads are more
cooperative and less bellicose compared to mixed dyads or jointly nondemocratic dyads
(Belnager et al., 2005, p. 438). Political regimes and democratic peace are important variables in
studying states’ behavior. Despite voluminous literature on democratic peace, there is little work
specifically focusing on the application of the democratic peace in foreign states intervention in
secessionist conflict and recognition of aspirant states. Thus, applying the logic to recognition of
aspirant states can provide significant insights about the dynamic of international recognition and
expansion of the democratic peace explanatory power.
The United States and other democracies are shown to be reluctant in extending
recognition to secessionist states emerging from democratic states and are particularly careful in
cases where secession emerges from autocratic states. There is no autocratic counterpart to this
argument. Extension of recognition to aspirant states by autocratic states is dependent upon the
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decision of the leaders and the states’ geo-strategic interests. In other words, nondemocratic
states, for the most part, are driven by the pursuit of national interests and do not consider regime
type when determining whether to provide recognition for an aspirant state. These states, unlike
democracies, are less constraint in their international behavior (Belanger, Duchesen and Paquin,
2005; Sideman, Dougherty, and Jenne, 2005). Empirical studies aimed at testing the realist and
liberal perspectives regarding states’ behavior towards aspirant states demonstrate that the realist
arguments pointing to the national interests of states play a significant role in recognition of
aspirant states. However, the international system and its democratic major powers appreciate
democracy in aspirant states, especially since the end of the Cold War and, thus, are likely or
expected to confer recognition to aspirant states that are more democratic (Caspersen, 2008).
Ozpek (2014) conducted a comparative analysis of democratic and nondemocratic major
powers’ policy towards de facto states. He concluded that the national interest argument,
grounded in realism, better explained why major powers recognized some of the de facto states,
not regime type. Following the end of the Cold War and the ascension of the United States as
hegemon of the international system, a new norm in the international system has taken place
where the emphasis on democratic standards is new (Ryngaert and Sobrie 2011). Both the
aspirant states and their home states, conscious of the emphasis on democratization in the
international system, have engaged in democratization. Because democracy is seen as a principal
element in gaining international recognition. Some home states adopt the strategy of
democratization to delegitimize the seceding regions’ attempts for independence and separate
statehood while the aspirant states use democratization for their ambitions of full statehood and
international recognition (Caspersen, 2015).
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Following Kosovo’s recognition by the Western democracies, several other aspirant
states—including Somaliland, Abkhazia, and Palestine—have attempted to attract international
recognition through “democratization-for-recognition strategy” (Baar et al, 2016, p.89). A select
number of aspirant states in recent decades have focused on creating effective governments and
democratic institutions as well as an emphasis on and invocation of the right of selfdetermination in their interaction with the outside world. Scharf (2003, p.374) calls this new
approach “strategy of earned sovereignty”. Moreover, the democratic peace theory, based on the
“Kantian” (Kacowicz; 1998, p.41) three-part hypothesis, democracy - international organizations
- international trade, relies on the externalization of liberal norms in the international relations of
countries governed through a liberal democratic framework (Rosato; 2003, p.586). There are
several suppositions made based on the democratic peace theory. First, based on the “monadic
democratic peace” argument (Stockemer, 2008, p.7), democracies are more peaceful and
cooperative in their relations with all other states in the system. Second, based on the “dyadic
democratic peace” (Lin, 2014, p.348) argument, democracies are more peaceful only in their
relations with other democracies. Third, systemic democratic peace, which maintains that the
more democracies there are in a region or the international system, the more peaceful the region
or the international system, will be. Therefore, according to the democratic peace argument,
democratic governments, supposedly and in theory, are more inclined to cooperate with similar
regimes, while nondemocratic regimes may not have to follow similar behavior patterns.
However, some scholars doubt the existence of any significant relationship between democracy
and peace (Layne, 1994; Rosato, 2003). Nonetheless, the relationship between democratic and
nondemocratic states and recognition of aspirant states is worth examining.
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Despite the emphasis on democratization among aspirant and home states, there is no
systematic study focusing on the relationship between regime type, democratization, and
recognition. Ozpek (2014) analyzed the relationship between regime type of great powers and de
facto states, but his study was limited to de facto states and great powers only. Therefore, a study
focusing on the relationship between recognition by all states and democratization among
aspirant and home states can contribute to literature. The next section provides a discussion of
cultural and identity politics and their relationship with recognition decisions.

Religion
Many variables explaining the recognition decisions of small and big powers focus on
geostrategic, security, stability, and general national interest of states grounded in the realism
tradition. However, it is important to examine alternative explanations of a state’s behavior in
international relations such as identity politics. The international recognition, as evident from the
existing literature, is dominated by power politics. However, there is a growing literature on the
important influence of culture and identity, specifically religion and ethnic ties, in international
politics (Gill, 2001). Religion and religious institutions affect the behavior patterns of states in
the international arena, especially issues of peace and conflict (Fox and Sandler, 2004; Sandal
and James, 2010). There are numerous studies focusing on the relationship between religion,
democracy, economic issues, women and human rights, armed conflicts, civil wars, peace, and
security at the domestic level of states (Buckley and Mantilla,2013; Juergensmeyer,2000;
McCleary and Barro, 2006; Sarkissian, 2015; Warner, 2000).
Although there is a growing literature concerning religion and religious institutions and
their effect on domestic politics, the implications of religion and religious institutions in
international policy outcome is not extensively explored. Henne (2013) maintains that countries,
46

which regulate and incorporate religion in their policies, are more likely to support international
resolutions that condemn religious defamation. Nilsson (2012) argues that international peace
agreements where religious institutions are involved have a longer durability. A cross-national
study showed that a correlation existed between religion and the way relationships were formed
between some countries involved in conflict and security challenges (Vullers, Pfeiffer, and
Basedau, 2015). The single most important work examining the relationship between religion
and states’ decision to extend or withhold recognition to aspirant states is by Mirilovic and
Siroky (2015, 2016). Their comparative case studies of Kosovo, Palestine, and Israel
demonstrate that there is a correlation and causation between religion and states’ decisions
regarding recognition of aspirant states. They focus on two “mechanisms; one at the domestic
level through religious institutions and one at the international level through religious affinities”
(Mirilovic and Siroky, 2015, p.263). However, additional research in this area can further
explore variation across time and explain the timing and the dynamics of recognition decisions.
Ethnic ties and kinship can influence recognition of aspirant states. States who see the
aspirant states’ population “as more self-like will be deemed more deserving of recognition and
external sovereignty (Coggins, 2014, p.143). Onuha (2012) argues that statesmen who share
similar ethnic identity with secessionist movements have demonstrated a willingness to support
the separatists’ ambition for statehood. O’Loughlin and Kolossov (2002) examined public
opinion surveys among Slavic countries. They conclude that people in Russia and other Slavic
states strongly supported ethnic and Orthodox Christian Serbs and their nationalistic quests in the
Balkans. They also found a relatively stronger empathy towards Serbs and the populations of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia among the Slavic states.
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The ethnic based support by Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan is evident in NagornoKarabakh and Cyprus. Azerbaijan and Armenia’s support to groups in Nagorno-Karabakh is
divided along ethnic lines (Souleimanov, 2013). There is a consensus that when all other
variables are equal the leadership of a country sharing ethnic ties to a group contesting territorial
sovereignty, the kin-country will support the group with whom it shares ethnic identity (Byman
et al, 2001; Richmond, 2006; Weingast, 1995). Moreover, Constructivists, building on in-group
and out-group principles of social psychology, argue that polities with shared identities that see
each other more self-like are cooperative and sympathetic with one another.Thus, aspirant states
are more likely to gain recognition and external support from states with shared sense of identity,
especially their co-religionists and co-ethnic groups (Beyer, 2016; Druckman, 1994; Gubler and
Gong, 2009; Mercer, 1995). Religion is the last of the major explanations behind recognition
decisions. The proceeding conclusion provides a synthetization of the findings and places them
into context for hypothesis development and subsequent research objectives and design.

Literature Review Summary
The literature identifies two categories of factors behind states’ recognition decisions.
First, the international or systemic level, which can be divided into two groups of factors. One,
the normative and legal group which includes the international law, norms, and to a degree,
doctrines. Second, the political factors including external security environment, geostrategic and
foreign policy objectives of states, regime type, and identity politics. The second category of
factors are at the domestic level of states. This includes security, national politics, the role of
interest groups on foreign policy, and identity politics that is bidirectional as it has both an
international and national level dimension.
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The international legal aspect of recognition is debated between two camps: the
declaratory and constitutive theories for statehood. The two norms of territorial integrity and
self-determination are ambiguous and in a debated status. The former emphasis on sovereignty
and unchangeable borders of states, while the latter, self-determination, advocates the right of
people to decide their political destiny and obliges the international community to assist such
efforts. The prevalent recognition doctrines are policy driven and have not proved consequential
in setting up some universal principles upon which states would make their recognition
decisions. They do not draw clear distinction between recognition of states versus governments.
Almost all scholars, as evident in the literature review, agree that international factors behind
recognition decisions are driven by their national interests. States either ignore provisions of the
international law, norms, doctrines, and principles or bend them in favor of their decisions that
are based, for the most part, on the political realities and national interests.
The domestic level factors namely national politics, domestic security, identity politics,
and the role of interest groups in relationship with international recognition is less explored and
case specific. As Crawford (1996, 1995) showed, national politics outweigh external factors and
impact foreign policy choices including international recognition when the issue is either less
important, the international system lacks clear principles on the issue, or the decision will not
create controversy. Most importantly, national politics influence foreign policy decisions when
the issue at hand is not a threat to national security.
According to the conventional wisdom in international relations, power politics grounded
in national interests and self-preservation take precedence over identity and idealistic factors.
Recognition decision is not exempt from this line of argument. However, international
recognition has not been systematically studied or theorized. Coggins’s (2011, 2014) study of
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recognition of aspirant states focused on the role of great powers. Crawford (1995, 1996) studied
the unilateral recognition of former USSR states. Mirilovic and Siroky (2014, 2015) studied the
link between religion and international recognition in the cases of Palestine and Kosovo. Ozpek
(2014) studied the relationship between recognition and regime type. His study like Coggins
focused only on great powers. The vulnerability variable focusing on states with separatist
movements of their own has not been fully tested. Coggins’s (2011, 2014) test of the theory was
only limited to great powers and the results, when isolated from other variables, are inconclusive.
Other scholars are also dubious of its explanatory power. In sum, the literature provides several
explanations for international recognition of aspirant states such as national interests, national
politics, the role of great powers, international law, norms, doctrines, interest groups and political
parties, identity relations, theory of vulnerability, and regime type. Scholars have studied
recognition of some single or multiple cases and focused on a limited number of recognizers, the
great powers for example, and their explanations are specific to each case.
There are two weaknesses or under-researched areas in the literature. One, the research
on recognition of aspirant states is case specific or limited to a select number of recognizers.
Recognition is not theorized or studied in a systematic way where a general pattern of behavior
could be drawn to explain recognition by all states in the system. Second, the literature focuses
on the classic power-politics explanations grounded in the national interests and the realist
tradition. Some variables are under researched. The theory of vulnerability, the identity politics,
and the role of regime type in recognition decisions is ambiguous because it is understudied, case
specific, or debated. It is for these reasons, that this research will study these three variables. The
variables will be analyzed through a theoretical framework and create relevant hypotheses in the
subsequent section.
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Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
This subsection includes hypotheses and the adoption of relevant theoretical framework
for the three variables selected in the preceding section. Establishing a connection between the
independent variables and the existing IR theories delivers two things. First, its serves as a guide
on which to build and structure the main arguments of this thesis. Second, positioning and the
main arguments within the relevant theories provides an opportunity to assess which IR theory
best describes recognition decision among states.
The first variable is the vulnerability proposition that posits states vulnerable to domestic
separatist movements are unlikely to recognize an aspirant state. The second variable examines
the linkage between regime type of the recognizer, aspirant, and home states and recognition
decisions. Democracies are more likely to recognize an aspirant state that is more democratic
than its parent or home state. However, democracies are less likely to recognize an aspirant state
when the home state is more democratic than the aspirant state. The last variable examines if
religious similarities and differences between the recognizer, aspirant, and home states affect
recognition. States are likely to recognize an aspirant state when both the recognizer and
aspirant adhere to the same religion and the home state’s majority population practices a religion
different from the aspirant and recognizer states. If it is the opposite situation, recognizer is less
likely to recognize the aspirant state. Each of the three variables are placed within the relevant
theoretical framework followed by proposed hypotheses starting with the vulnerability
proposition.
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The vulnerability proposition
States that have a domestic separatist or secessionist movement of their own do not
support similar movements abroad and are naturally inhibited to recognize aspirant states. This
argument is referred to as the “vulnerability proposition” by Sideman (2001). Other scholars
refer to the argument simply as vulnerability or the vulnerability argument. Mirilovic and Siroky
(2014, 2015) termed it “the vulnerability theory”. Several scholars studying secession in the
African regional context argue that because of the vulnerability factor states refrained from
intervening in domestic affairs of other countries and especially when the issue of secession was
at stake (Herbst, 1989; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Cervenka, 1969). The logic of vulnerability
explains why some states, Spain for example, avoid recognition of Palestinian and Kosovar
states (Hill and Jewett, 1994). Recognition of an aspirant state by such a state emboldens
domestic separatist movements and legitimizes their claims. It is a threat to domestic security
and can potentially lead to territorial disintegration of the recognizer. The vulnerability argument
suggests that states vulnerable to secession are more likely to support home states and oppose
aspirant states (Ayoob, 1995; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Herbst, 1989; Touval, 1972).
The vulnerability argument reflects the worldview of political realism in international
relations (IR). Realism operates under a few basic assumptions that are key in understanding the
behavior of states in international politics. First, states are the most important and principle
actors. Realists believe states, possessing the monopoly of legitimate force and sovereignty, are
able to resolve conflicts between groups and individuals within its territory as well as other states
and international actors, are the principle actors in the international system (Waltz, 1979).
Realists acknowledge the importance of non-state actors like the UN, World Bank, International
Monetary Fund, and Multinational Corporation, but consider them as secondary actors. Second,
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state is viewed as a unitary actor (Keohane, 1986, p.64). Realists posit that national interests
trump domestic differences and that government of a state speak with one voice for the state as
whole. Thus, for realist, a country faces the outside world as an integrated unit. Third, decision
makers are rational (Mearsheimer, 1994, p.10). States are goal oriented and their goals are
consisted. States, when necessary, engaged in cost-benefit analysis, consider every alternative,
and choose the option that maximize their benefit. Thus, states change their strategies and
behavior to maximize their national interests. Fourth, the international system is anarchic. States
coexist in a context of international anarchy where each state has to survive on its own
(Mearsheimer, 1994, p.10). Since there is no centralized authority or government to provide
protection or enforce laws. Thus, states are by definition self-help-agents.
Realism in the broadest terms is divided into two categories; classical or traditional
realism and neorealism. There are other narrower subsets to each of the two. However, for the
purpose of this study it is sufficient to briefly introduce the two major categories. Among the key
proponents of traditional or classic realism are Edward Hallett Carr and Hans Morgenthau.
Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis, first published in 1939, is a cornerstone of realism in the
twentieth century. Morgenthau’s Scientific Man Versus Power Politics is another foundational
work in traditional realism. Morgenthau (1946) developed a comprehensive international theory
of realism. The six principles of Morgenthau (1954) further systemized realism in international
relations.
The traditional classical realism was further developed into a more methodologically
rigorous approach to theorizing about international affairs. Neorealism or structural realism
introduced by Kenneth Waltz (1979) remains a more modern rendition of the theory that focuses
primarily on the effects of the structure of international system. In Waltz’s conceptualization,
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two elements are essential: 1) the international system’s ordering principle is anarchy, a lack of
central government or authority, which leads to a self-help system made up of autonomous
states; 2) distribution of capabilities or power. These two aspects of the system determine how
states behave.
Despite their similarities, four differences between classical realism and neorealism are
noteworthy. First, Classical realists find the sources of conflict and war in human nature while
neo-realists identify the sources to be the anarchic system of the international system. Second,
Classical realists consider state to be above the system while neo-realists weigh in on the agency
of the system (Hosson, 2000). Third, Classical realists differentiate between status-quo powers
while neo-realists consider states as unitary actors (Schweller, 1996, p.155). Last, unlike
classical realists, neo-realists adopt a more rigorous approach to international politics influenced
by the behaviorist revolution of 1960s (George and Sorensen, 2007, p.75).
Realism, regardless of its nuanced subcategories, emphasizes the state to be the principle
actor in IR, which is primarily motivated by its national interests in its foreign policy and
international behavior. The central premise of realism is self-preservation, national security, and
power politics. All nation-states are motivated by national interests, or, at best, national interests
disguised as moral concerns. At its most fundamental level, the national interest is generic and
easy to define: all states seek to preserve their political autonomy and their territorial integrity
(Wendt, 2007).
The above introduction of political realism in IR shows that national interest and more
specifically national security are central issues for the realist worldview. The vulnerability
proposition can be best positioned in the theoretical framework of realism. Realism emphasizes
states’ “preservation or ‘security’ of the self (Wendt, 2007, p.339) in the international system.
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Thus, a state vulnerable to separatist movement will not recognize another similar movement
abroad. Such a move endangers its own national security and territorial integrity.
Though the vulnerability argument is parsimonious and straightforward, it does not fully
explain the recognition decisions of vulnerable states or their support for secessionist movements
abroad. Heraclides (1990) argues that multiethnic states vulnerable to domestic separatism are
not inhibited from recognizing secessionist movements abroad. Sideman (1997; 2001) also
maintains that empirical support for vulnerability propositions is weak. Sideman (1997) argues
that states with secessionist problems of their own have supported and recognized aspirant states,
and that the vulnerability argument has not led states to follow consistent policies towards
aspirant states. For example, United Kingdom and France, who have experienced some
separatism, supported Yugoslavia's integrity, but quickly accepted various plans to partition
Bosnia. Serbia despite its vulnerability to secession supported the separatist efforts of Serbs in
Croatia and Bosnia. Moreover, Russia has backed Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs despite its
secessionist conflict in Chechnya (Nichol, 2008; Popescu, 2006; Lewis, 2002, Laitan and
Samatar, 1987). Coggins (2011, 2014) applied the vulnerability argument in her analysis of
recognition by great powers. Her results, limited to great powers, had mixed or inconclusive
results.
Validity and explanatory power of the vulnerability proposition is contested and does not
lead states to avoid adopting a consistent foreign policy towards aspirant states. The vulnerability
argument and its contested status in the literature leads to the following hypothesis:
•

H1: States with separatist challenges of their own are less likely to recognize aspirant
states.
The second set of hypotheses investigates the recognition decision based on regime type.

As previously state, based on the Democratic Peace Theory, democracies are more likely to
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recognize an aspirant state that is more democratic compared to its parent state. The hypotheses
created based on this explanation follows as below.

Regime type: the role of democracy in recognition
Evaluating the role of political regime type in recognition of aspirant states is built on
two broad groups of factors. First, the democratic peace theory and the alignment choices of
states during interstate militarized disputes. The Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) is one of the
main contributions of the liberalism paradigm to IR. DPT posits that democracies cooperate with
one another and rarely go to war with one another for two reasons. First, democracies are
restrained by domestic factors. Second, democracies see one another as legitimate and nonthreatening. Therefore, they cooperate with other democratic states more than nondemocracies
and are supportive of democratic movements globally. They generally favor expansion of
democratic regimes (Shapiro, 2011). This cooperative nature among democracies and the overall
promotion of democratization globally is sometimes referred to as “democratic solidarity”
(Cooper and Legler, 2001; Niedererger, 2013). DPT is a sub-field of the Liberalism paradigm in
IR. As such, the paradigm is introduced in the following subsection.
The Liberalism paradigm and its approach to the study of international politics entered
academia following World War I. The origins of modern liberal approach to IR can be traced
back to thinkers and philosophers such as Adam Smith, John Locke, Voltaire, Immanuel Kant,
and others. Kant’s essay Perpetual Peace (1795) proposes a few conditions that will ensure
global peace, cooperation, prosperity, and security among states. These include international
institutions or a “federation of free states”, international law and norms and economic
interdependence and free trade or “universal hospitality”, and the democratic peace theory or in
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Kant’s words “republican constitutions” (Ossipow, 2008, p.357-375). These elements became
dominant themes for the different versions of liberal theories in IR following World War II. The
liberal IR theories are diverse, however they all share a few basic assumptions. 1) Liberalism
agrees with realism that states are the primary actors in the international system, but they are not
the only actors. States are not unitary as domestic politics matter too. 2) There are factors other
than capabilities that influence and constraint behavior of states. 3) States’ interests are diverse
and evolve over time (Jahn, 2013). The liberal theories of IR are generally characterized by their
optimistic view about creation of prosperity and a peaceful global environment through strong
international institutions and international law despite anarchy in the system. Though states are
considered the primary actors in an anarchic environment of the system, interstate conflict can be
mitigated through cooperation, international institutions, free trade, and promotion of democratic
values.
Morvacik (1997) has reformulated the liberal IR theory into a “nonideological and
nonutopian form appropriate to empirical social science” (Morvacik, 1997, p.1), which includes
a socio-scientifically rigorous manner. The basic premise of the liberal IR theory is “that the
relationship between states and the surrounding domestic and transnational society in which they
are embedded critically shapes state behavior by influencing the social purposes underlying state
preferences" (Marvacik, 1997, p.516). This fundamental premise is built upon three core
assumptions which are “1) The Primacy of Societal Actors: The fundamental actors in
international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and riskaverse” manner. 2) Representation and State Preferences States (or other political institutions)
represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define
state preferences and act purposively in world politics. 3) Interdependence and the International
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System: The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior” (1997,
p.515-520). In view of these assumptions, he argues there are three mainstream types of IR
liberal theories: “Ideational liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of conflict and
compatibility among collective social values or identities concerning the scope and nature of
public goods provision. Commercial liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of gains and
losses to individuals and groups in society from transnational economic interchange. Republican
liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of varying forms of domestic representation and
the resulting incentives for social groups to engage in rent seeking” (Morvacik, 1997, p.515).
As explained above, DPT and alliance choices of states serve as the main reasons for
studying the relationship between regime type and recognition decisions. Werner and Lemke
(1997) evaluated the alignment decisions of democratic and autocratic states during “militarized
interstate disputes between 1816 and 1986” (Werner and Lemke, 1997, p.530). Their findings
show that states sharing similar political regimes align with one another during international
conflicts. Other key points of their conclusion are interesting as they set the stage for future
research. They conclude that:
[A] relationship exists between alignment behavior in international disputes and
differences in political and economic institutions... this relationship persists regardless of
whether the aligning state is democratic or autocratic. The empirical evidence also
suggests that the power of each disputing side is important to some aligning states, but
not to others. In particular, autocratic aligning states are far more likely to align with a
side as its power grows, whereas democratic aligning states are not systematically
influenced by power considerations. Finally, the data provide confounding information
regarding the effect of alliance commitments on alignment behavior. Whereas the
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alignment choices of democracies are not affected by alliance commitments, such
promises do affect autocratic alignment behavior… These results suggest interesting
implications for research on the democratic peace, the determinants of threat in the
international system, and the impact of selection effects. (p.529-543).

Furthermore, as reported in the literature review, both aspirant and home states use
democratization as a strategy to influence third states’ behavior towards themselves. Some
aspirant states, for instance Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria,
Somaliland, Kosovo, and Palestine, have adopted “democratization-for-recognition strategy”
(Baar et al, 2016, p.89) to campaign for their international recognition, full statehood, and
membership in the UN. Similarly, home states engage in democratization to gain favor with
other democratic states and delegitimize aspirant states’ claim for statehood. Laurence Broers
(2005, p.71) argues that both home and aspirant states engage in “competitive democratization”
to influence international recognition by demonstrating that they are more democratic than the
other. Kosovo’s recognition by Western democracies has encouraged other aspirant states to
attract international recognition through “democratization-for-recognition strategy” (Baar et al,
2016, p.89). Both the aspirant and home states have focused on creating effective governments
and democratic institutions as well as an emphasis on the right of self-determination in their
interaction with the outside world. Scharf (2003, p.374) calls this new approach “strategy of
earned sovereignty”. Based on the Kantian traditions and the DPT, democracies are arguably
more inclined to recognize a democratic aspirant state. The discussion of DPT, the democratic
solidarity, the alliance decision of states based on political regime, democratization for
recognition strategy, competitive democratization, and strategy of earned sovereignty, lead to the
following hypotheses:
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•
•

H2: Democratic states are more likely to recognize an aspirant state when the aspirant
state is more democratic than the home state.
H3: Democratic states are less likely to recognize an aspirant state when the home state
is more democratic than the aspirant state.

The last variable selected for investigation in this research is the relationship between
identity politics and recognition decisions. The subsection below includes hypotheses based on
religious affinities and their placement within their relevant theoretical framework.

Identity politics: religion and recognition
The influence of religion has received little attention in IR. Some IR scholars,
proponents of liberalism and realism, overlook religion and other identity factors, like ethnicity,
to provide some parsimonious explanations for world politics. Whenever religion has been
addressed, it is referred to in a bigger context of civilizations, organizations, institutions, and
society at large. Religion was considered to have an insignificant role or marginal influence in
the policies of the USA and USSR during the cold war era, theories of IR mainly focused on
power politics and balance of power. Thus, unlike sociology, political science and other
disciplines, religion has had minor reflection in IR (Carment and James, 1997; Nukhet, 2011;
Oliver, 1999).
The secularization theory pushed religion as a private matter where it would not be
considered an important variable in the public arena. This notion coalesced, at least among the
secularized academia, to the “demystification of religion inherent in the classic secularization
paradigm posits a gradual, persistent, unbroken erosion of religious influence in urban industrial
societies” (Shupe, 1990, p.19). Casanova (2001) also believes one reason religion has not been
incorporated into IR is the secular nature of the discipline where three assumptions played a
significant role: the proliferation of rationality, secularity, and modernity. Casanova (2011)
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revaluates these assumptions and argues that religion has reemerged as a major force in global
politics, especially after the end of the Cold War. Desch (2013) also agrees that religion has been
an overlooked variable in IR because of the persistent power of secularization thesis. He
maintains religion is resurfacing in IR and considers three waves of such a reappearance. First,
“religion’s residual legacy in secular international relation” that denotes even very secularist
notions which are reinforced by past or current religions experiences. He elaborates this has a
larger implication for IR as the most secular states and statesmen will favor states and
movements that closely resembled the religious and cultural fabric of their states and societies.
Second, “causes and consequences of the global resurgence of religion in terms of the numerical
spread of belief and the greater incidence of religiously motivated events” globally. Third, the
“conceptual aspect of the resurgence of religion: the growing challenge to the notion that religion
is a distinct social element that can be separated from the other factors shaping global politics”
(Desch, 2013, p.16). The proliferation of religiously motivated international political events is
leading to a “gradual decline of secularism in international relations” (Desch, 2013, p.40). Other
scholars also point out the important role of religion in IR yet express concern about the marginal
attention it receives in the larger field of IR. Shah notes that “religion has become one of the
most influential factors in world affairs in the last generation but remains one of the least
examined factors in the professional study and practice of world affairs” (Shah et al. 2012, p.3).
Some scholars have pushed back against the western-centric and secular nature of IR and started
to consider religion and other identity related factors.
Although, religion has never been completely absent from the study of international
politics. As Fox argues, IR scholars have been “blinded by their secular paradigms to pay
attention to it” (Fox, 2009, p. 276), especially before the end of the Cold War. In the decades
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following the Cold War era, the study of religion and international relations has increased
drastically. Berger (1999) argues that the secularization thesis needs reconsideration as religion
is not on the decline and its role in international politics needs rigorous study. Esposito (1999)
points to the growing international security issues related to Islam and advocated inclusion of
religion as an important variable in IR. Gill (2001) maintains that ignoring religion in IR is a
serious problem for two reasons. First, religion and religious organizations are deeply rooted in
nations. Ignoring such an ingrained part of a nation results in miscalculation of global politics.
Second, religious beliefs are key elements in understanding political participation, international
conflict, and cooperation. Kabalkova (2000, 2003) even proposed the creation of a new subfield
in IR called “International Political Theology” (IPT). She maintains that scholars of IR made a
correction when “International Political Economy” (IPE) was added to the field to account for
the neglect of economic factors in the IR discipline. The post-secular IR scholarship needs to
take the roles of religion, ideals, ideologies, and culture to better explain global politics.
Kabalkova (2000, p. 708) concludes that “Gilpin’s famous dictum about IPE to the effect that IR
is about power and wealth, I add that IR in the contemporary world with its ever-increasing
global stakes is not only about power and wealth but perhaps even more so about values and the
meaning of the very human existence. Hence IPT.”
Fox (2001) identifies three ways religion influences global politics. First, religion
influences the decision-making process. Religion is part of people’s worldview and decision
makers are not exempted from it. Religion influences how decision makers view events and
perceive them and ultimately make decisions in view of their evaluation of global politics.
Second, religion is a source of legitimacy. Governments and statesmen uses religion to justify
their legitimacy and pander to their base when making decision in international politics. Third,
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religion is an international issue and thus pertinent to IR. Religion has never been a domestic
issue due to its transnational dimension. Religious and ethnoreligious conflicts have a prominent
international aspect. Their implications usually involve cross-border and transitional actors (Fox,
2001, p.59-66). Fox and Sandler (2010) further refined influences of religion in IR four ways.
First, religion influences statesmen and leaders through shaping their worldviews, behavior, and
thoughts. Second, religion is a key element in formation of identity. Third, as previously stated,
religion is a source of legitimacy both at the national and international levels. Fourth, religion is
associated with international intuitions that can influence political process, for instance the
Catholic Church and the Organization for Islamic Cooperation.
Hurd (2007) shows, through a case study of Turkey, how religion has resurged following
the failure of secular autocratic regimes throughout the world, and how religion influences and
shapes inter-state relations. Religion is a powerful tool in shaping foreign policy of states. It can
be invoked to gain support of domestic constituents, influence international actors and
institutions. Alternatively, religion can be used to oppose international politics related issues as
religion is a bidirectional source both a “bearer of peace and the sword” (Appleby, 2000, p.20).
Religion is no longer a backburner variable in IR. However, it has not been theorized nor
incorporated to a single theory. Kabalkova’s (2000, 2003) IPT has not satisfied the theorization
of religion in IR. Sandal and James (2011) propose that religion can be incorporated to the major
IR theories “without stretching the limits of theories or disturbing their intellectual coherence, it
is quite possible to see possibilities for two-way interactions between the frameworks and
identity-related variables like religion” (Sandal and James, 2011, p.18).
They propose religion can be incorporated with classical realism as the sub-state account
of the theory’s explanation of international politics by focusing “on human nature, the flexible
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definition of rationality, interest and power as well as the widely used terminology of emotions
and cognition allow for integration of studies of belief systems and worldviews, over which
religion has significant influence”. Structural realism can adopt religion as a variable in the
contemporary model of foreign policy. Neoliberalism can incorporate religion into its framework
as it focuses on transnational institutions, creation of norms and regimes (Sandal and James,
2011, p.18-20).
The intersectionality of religion in different disciplines and its local, national, and
transnational dimension makes it hard to fit a single theory. However, the constructivism theory
or ontology seems the most suitable theoretical framework to study religion in IR. Several
scholars, considering religion to be an ideational factor, propose constructivism as the
appropriate theoretical avenue for religion in the field of IR (Barnett, 2011; Bellin, 2012; Hurd,
2011; Fox, 2004; Sandal and James, 2010).
Constructivist theory of IR emphasizes the state interests in terms of ideas and social
interaction. Constructivism includes a set of theories that focuses on social construction of
actors, events, institutions, and social relationships between actors rather than exclusively
material realities. Wendt defines two principles of constructivism: “(1) that the structures of
human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2)
that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather
than given by nature” (Wendt,1999, p.1). He further elaborates that states in the international
system view one another as friend, enemies, or rivals based on their social interaction and in
consideration of their own beliefs, identities, shared understanding, and practices about
themselves and others in the system. Constructivism has a wider application in several
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disciplines. However, one theory of constructivism in IR under discussion in this study is the
conceptualization presented by Wendt (1994):
Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following
core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for inter- national political
theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material;
and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social
structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic
politics. (P.385).

Hurd (2008) maintains that there are four distinguishing features of constructivism. First,
Constructivism proposes an alternative to materialism where “in a socially constructed world, the
existence of patterns, cause-and effect relationships, and even states themselves depends on webs
of meaning and practices that constitute them” (Hurd, 2008, p.300). This is reinforced by Wendt
who argues that “a fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward
objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them”
(Wendt, 1992, p.396-397). The second feature is the construction of states interest.
Constructivists do not deny the materialist basis of state interest. However, they argue the
interpretation of the material capabilities matters most. For instance, the hostility of “North
Korean missiles shows that American leaders respond to the social relationship between the USA
and the military resources of others, friend or enemy, rather than to the hardware itself” (Hurd,
2008, p.302). Legro further explains that “new foreign policy ideas are shaped by preexisting
dominant ideas and their relationship to experienced events” (Legro, 2005, p.4). The third feature
is mutual constitution of structures and agents. Norms and practices in international system are
products of state actions and influences upon other states. Thus, “the idea that states and the
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international environment are mutually constituted” (Hurd, 2008, p.304). The fourth feature of
constructivism is its multiple logics of anarchy. The multiplicity of anarchy is based on the three
cultures of anarchy prescribed by Wendt (1992), based on the philosophical views of Thomas
Hobbes, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant, characterized respectively by “enmity,” “rivalry,” and
“friendship” (Wendt 1992, p. 391-425).
Although constructivism, as reviewed so far, does not explicitly maintain that religion
shapes identities of states, a case can be made that religion is best reflected in the constructivist
paradigm of IR. Religion and religious beliefs shape the personality and worldview of leaders
and is ingrained in the national identity of states. According to the constructivism tradition, states
perceive one another as enemy, friend, or rival based on their social instruction. Previous
knowledge or shared values and beliefs are essential in making judgments among states and
formulating foreign policies. Some scholars incorporate religion and argue that the in-group and
out-group formation of identity found in “Social Identity Theory” is applicable in IR under the
broader constructivist paradigm. Statesmen and leaders exhibit a desire to cooperate with their
coreligionist states, institutions, movements, and belligerency. This is true for states that are not
theocracies or where religion does not heavily influence political process (Abdelal et al., 2006;
Acharya, 2000; Albert et al., 2001).
The scholarship surrounding the significant role of religion in IR, especially after the end
of Cold War, is growing. However, its role in recognition of aspirant states is under-researched.
States can recognize an aspirant state dependent on inter-group identity relations. As reported in
the literature review, the identity-based relationships between the aspirant, recognizer, and home
states can potentially affect international recognition. This perspective derives from the
constructivist conception of shared ideas, beliefs, identity, and cultural values in international
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relations and their effect on states’ behavior. Security interests often are considered the material
explanations for state behavior. However, non-material and identity relations can influence
change in international relations because they empower actors through discourse and shape
identities, which determine individual and state interests (Giddens, 1984).
The constructivist perspective and the role of identity relations might explain recognition of
aspirant states. This research uses religion to measure identity relations for two reasons. First, the
chances of similar religion between aspirant, home, and the recognizer state is higher while it is
lower for ethnic ties, except states that are in vicinity of the aspirant states (Coggins, 2014).
Moreover, some scholars, drawing on the relationship between of religion with democracy,
economic issues, women and human rights, peace, and security at the domestic level of states,
analyzed international relations through an inside-out perspective where domestic politics affect
foreign policy (Buckley and Mantilla, 2013; Juergensmeyer, 2000; McCleary and Barro, 2006;
Sarkissian, 2015; Warner, 2000). Second, the comparative case studies of Kosovo, Palestine, and
Israel (Mirilovic and Siroky 2015; 2016) demonstrate the existence of a correlation and causation
between religion and recognition. Their study was limited only to three countries. This project
will examine the relationship between recognition and religious identity across all existing
members of the UN.
The relationship between religion and recognition leads to the following hypotheses:
•
•

H5: Aspirant states are more likely to gain recognition when aspirant and recognizer
states have similar religion.
H6: Aspirant states are less likely to gain recognition when the home state and the
recognizer states have the same religion.
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Conclusion
This chapter provided a review of the existing literature on aspirant states and their
international recognition. The chapter was divided into several subsections for clarity and
organization. The definition and terminology section addressed the controversy over terms and
definitions. After comparing and contrasting several definitions and terms, aspirant state was
selected as an appropriate term and a working definition was established. The different
approaches and understanding of the practice of international recognition was evaluated. A
definition of the recognition capturing major conceptualizations by a majority of scholars was
adopted for this thesis.
The motivations and reasons behind recognition decisions were reviewed. The literature
identified the major factors that repeatedly emerged in the scholarship on the topic. The existing
literature identifies a number of variables that influences recognition decisions. These include
international law and normative explanations, system level explanations, domestic and national
politics of the states, the role played by the home or parent states, the regime type of the states,
and identity politics. An analysis of the literature showed that identity politics, regime type, and
vulnerability – states facing their own separatist movements – were the less explored and underresearched areas. These three variables are selected for further investigation. The studies that
included these variables produced inconclusive results and or were case specific. The hypotheses
and theoretical framework subsection of the literature review included generation of hypotheses
for the selected variables. This section also outlined the suitable theoretical parameters placing
the variables and hypotheses within the framework of relevant IR theories. The next chapter is
about research design. It will present operationalization of the main variables, data sources, and
methodological steps that will facilitate the hypothesis testing.
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CHAPTER 3:
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction
This chapter outlines the research design and methods used in this study. It defines the
research questions and objectives of the study. The dependent, independent, and control
variables are described and operationally defined. The chapter also provides information about
the data sources, data collection techniques, and the statistical method employed to test the
hypotheses. Though the ten cases selected for this study are identified in the discussion of
conceptual definition subsection of the literature review, the case selection methods and
techniques are discussed in this chapter. Lastly, the chapter ends with providing background
information about each of the ten cases.

Delimitation and Research Question
This research is primarily concerned with identifying and evaluating the factors,
motivations, and reasons behind states’ recognition decisions. Specifically, this thesis focuses on
international recognition of aspirant states. The primary research question guiding this thesis is:
what factors explain recognition of aspirant states by the existing member states of the
international community? There are three secondary research questions that are in line with three
groups of hypotheses. One, do states that are domestically vulnerable to secession recognize
aspirant states? Two, do democratic and free countries recognize aspirant states that are
comparatively more democratic than their home/parent states? Three, does religion shape states’
recognition decision? There are several potential factors behind recognition decisions. This study
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explores three broad categories of factors. First, the vulnerability of states facing internal
separatist movements, thereafter labeled as ‘vulnerability’. Second, the relationship between
regime type and recognition, which will be referred to as ‘regime type’ for the remainder of this
research. Third, the relationship between religion and recognition decisions, shortened to
‘religion’. The unit of analysis is the country level recognition decisions, specifically recognition
of an aspirant state by a sovereign state. Thus, the spatial domain is limited to states that are
members of the UN. The sovereign UN member state, for the purpose of this study, is labeled as
‘the recognizer’. The temporal range of the spatial units, UN member states, is the year 2011.
Recognition is a changeable practice. States can withdraw, freeze, or suspend recognition. For
example, several countries withdrew, suspended, or even froze recognition of the Western
Sahara over the past few decades. Another example is Taiwan and China--several countries
withdrew their recognition of Taiwan or switched their diplomatic relationship to the Peoples’
Republic of China. Thus, though the temporal range is restricted to 2011, it includes recognitions
that precede 2011 and are not withdrawn or frozen by 2011. Due to unavailability of data, the
temporal range does not extend beyond 2011. This study uses existing data, found in the
literature and existing databases, and thus does not include generation of an original dataset. The
existing data is restructured and reconfigured for this research. The restrictive temporal range
isolates and excludes the states that emerged after the implosion of the USSR in 1991-1992 from
this research. The latter is excluded because some of the former Soviet republics were sovereign
states before their incorporation into the USSR. Some of these states, the central Asian countries
for instance, did not face major challenges in achieving widespread recognition and admission to
the UN. Another group of former USSR republics are the Baltic States. The circumstances
surrounding their recognition are unique. For instance, incorporation of the Baltic States into
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USSR was followed by international condemnation and their international recognition was quick
and less complicated due to their previous sovereign statehood.
This research employs a Large-N quantitative research design to test the set of
hypotheses that were formulated, as described in the preceding section, based on the strength,
weakness, and gaps in the literature and their relationship with the existing IR theories. The
defining characteristics of Large-N quantitative research include a robust degree of reliability,
accuracy, external validity, and precision of the findings as “the greater the number of cases one
can work with the more robust and generalizable the results become” (Rothman, 2006, p.2). The
statistical method of Logistic Regression, also called Logit Model, is appropriate for this
research due to the dichotomist outcome of the dependent variable: recognition vs. nonrecognition. The six hypotheses will be tested using logit statistical model with a confidence
level of 95%. The Z-scores for 95% confidence level are -1.96 and +1.96 and the probability cut
off is 0.05. Thus, Z< -1.96 or > +1.96 and P< 0.05 (Hellevik, 2009).
The next subsection provides a description of the variables, their operationalization, and
sources of data.

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable (DV) in all of the six hypotheses is international recognition,
which is shortened to ‘recognition’. Hereafter, ‘recognition’ refers to recognition of an aspirant
state by a UN member state, alternatively called ‘the recognizer’. Operationally, recognition
means official acknowledgement of an aspirant state by an existing member of the UN as a new
sovereign and independent state with its own international legal personality. The empirical
characteristics of official recognition involves a formal declaration or resolution by the
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recognizer state that is officially published or sent to the aspirant state. This can be followed by
exchange of diplomats and establishment of official embassies or diplomatic missions. From a
measurement perspective, recognition is binary, and the responding outcome is dichotomous:
recognition vs non-recognition. The DV is coded (1) for recognition and (0) for non-recognition.
Information about recognition derives from two sources. First, the primary source of information
is the foreign ministries of each member state of the UN. Second, the first source is
complemented and confirmed by the evidence of recognition found in the literature as needed.

Independent Variables
Vulnerability
The independent variable in first hypothesis (H1) is ‘vulnerability’. A recognizer is
operationally defined as vulnerable if it is facing a domestic separatist movement that is actively
and publicly campaigning for secession from the home state either through peaceful or violent
means (Guibernau, 2006). Recognizer states are assigned a code between 0 – 3. States not facing
domestic secession are coded (0), while vulnerable states are coded between 2 – 3 depending on
the scale and intensity of secession. The variation is measured in terms of violence or
peacefulness of the secession. Vulnerable states without violence is coded (1) where secession
exists, but it does not involve armed conflict. For example, the Catalonia region is attempting to
secede from Spain through peaceful and democratic means, thus Spain is coded (1).
Vulnerable states involving violence and armed conflict are coded between 2 – 3. A state
is coded (2) if the armed conflict between the separatist entity and the parent state resulted in 25999 battle related deaths per year. States with secessionist conflicts resulting in a minimum of
1,000 battle related deaths per year are coded (3). In keeping with the temporal range of this
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study, the final vulnerability score assigned to each recognizer is the average between 1993 and
2011.
In the final reconfiguration of data and before performing the statistical tests, all
recognizer states are coded dichotomously in measuring vulnerability. States not vulnerable to
domestic separatism are coded (0). States vulnerable to domestic separatism are coded (1)
regardless of the number of deaths per year. Such a reconfiguration and the final binary coding
was adopted to meet the logit regression test technical requirement and the binary outcome of the
dependent variable. The second reason for the binary coding involves the consensus in the
literature about the causal relationship between vulnerability and recognition. Some scholars
maintain that states vulnerable to domestic separatism regardless of the scale and intensity will
avoid granting recognition to aspirant states, because it will legitimize the demands of their own
domestic separatist movements. For example, Bucheit (1978, p.103) argues that “even the
slightest recognition of secession…would be as unwise as showing blood in the lion’s cage” for
a vulnerable state.
A recognizer coded (0) is expected to recognize an aspirant state while a state coded (1)
will not extend recognition to an aspirant state. The level and the intensity of domestic separatist
movement of a recognizer, and direction of the relationship between the independent and
dependent variable is further elaborated in the coding rule, found in Appendix A. The previous
empirical studies of vulnerability have produced mixed or inconclusive results. This research
hypothesizes that a vulnerable state is unlikely to recognize an aspirant state. The primary
information source to measure a recognizer’s vulnerability comes from an original dataset on
secessionist movements between 1816 and 2011 produced by Ryan Griffiths (2015). The original
dataset by Griffiths measures the level of violence based on the number of deaths per year. His
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coding of the level of violence experienced annually in a given secessionist-home state dyad is as
follows: (0) – no violence, (1) – 25-999 battle related deaths per year, and (3) – 1,000+ battle
related deaths per year.

Regime type
This research investigates the causal relationship between political regime type,
specifically democracies, and recognition of aspirant states. As previously stated, this variable
extends the logic of democratic peace theory, a sub-theory of liberalism in IR, to recognition of
aspirant states. The democratic peace theory has been one of the most empirically wellestablished theories in IR that primarily suggests democracies are less apt to engage in conflict
with one another and are supportive of democratization processes worldwide. Building on DPT,
this variable focuses on the relationship between the levels of democracy among the parent and
aspirant states and how it affects recognition of aspirant state by democratic states.
Democratic states are operationally defined based on their level of freedom. This
operationalization is based on the Freedom House Index. Freedom House (FH) publishes an
annual report, Freedom in the World, on the degree of democratic freedoms in nations and
significant disputed territories around the world. FH employs a scale of 1-7, with one being the
freest and 7 being the least free. FH divides all states and disputed territories into three categories
based on the 1-7 scale: Free (1-2.5), Partly Free (3-5), and Not Free (5.5-7). Thus, using the data
from FH, the recognizer, parent, and home states are divided into these three categories.
The independent variable in hypotheses 3 and 4 is “competitive democratization”
(Broers, 2005, p.71), which is a comparison of levels of democracy between the parent and
aspirant states. There is a winner and loser between the parent and aspirant states in competitive
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democratization. The democratic recognizers’ recognition decision is influenced by the winner of
the competitive democratization process. Democratic recognizer states are expected to recognize
aspirant states, which are more democratic compared to their parent states. Alternatively,
democratic states are expected to avoid granting recognition to aspirant states when the parent
state is comparatively more democratic than the aspirant state. The direction of the relationship
between independent and dependent variables is positive; when the aspirant state has a higher
level of freedom compared to its parent state, the probability of recognition by democratic
recognizer states increases. For example, Somaliland is an aspirant state seceding from Somalia.
Somalia is ranked Not Free while Somaliland is Partly Free. The United States, a Free state, is
ought to recognize Somaliland because the aspirant is relative more free than the parent state.
Another example of the opposite case is Palestine and Israel. Israel is ranked Free while
Palestine is ranked as Not Free. In this case, the parent state is more free than the aspirant state.
Therefore, the United States is unlikely to recognize Palestine.
Based on the ranking of democratic states into Free and Partly Free by the Freedom
House, two variables were created; free and partly free states. The first variable will measure
recognition of aspirant states by democratic states labeled as Free. The second variable will
measure recognition of aspirant states by states labeled as Partly Free. Since this variable is
primarily concerned with recognition by a democratic state, autocratic recognizer states, labeled
as Not Free, are excluded from the statistical model.
The level of democracy among aspirant and parent states fluctuates. Sometimes the
recognizer, parent, and aspirant states can have the same freedom level or fall under the same
ranking (Free & Partly Free). These differences and alternative combinations; when the freedom
levels of all three entities (recognizer, aspirant, and home states) align, variegate, and or take a
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completely different form are taken into consideration. There are different probability values
assigned to each alternative combination. The probability scale assigned to each combination
are;0 – unlikely, 1 – likely, 2 – more likely, and 3 – highly likely. A detailed coding of this
variable is included in Appendix A.

Religion
Operationalization and measurement of religion in IR is a challenging issue. Empirical
studies including religion in a cross-national capacity are scarce within the field of IR. Fox
(2011, p.58) provides two reasons why religion is ignored in the quantitative studies of IR. First,
“the lack of attention that scholars give to the topic provides a poor basis on which to develop
variables”. Second, building quantifiable measurement requires accurate and reliable reading of
the “minds of political actors to discover their true motivations”, which is hard to achieve
empirically. This study investigates the causal relationship of religious similarities and
differences between recognizer, aspirant, and home states. As such, each unit under study—
recognizer, aspirant, home state—is operationally defined by the majority population of each unit
that are nominally members of or identify with a specific religion. For example, the majority of
the U.S. population identify as Christian while majority of the population in India adhere to
Hinduism. Therefore, U.S. is operationally measured a Christian country while India a Hindu
nation. The same operationalization applies to aspirant states. For instance, Somaliland and
Kosovo are defined as Muslim due to majority population’s identification with Islam, while
South Ossetia and Transnistria are defined as Christian.
Religion, present in H4 and H5, is a nominal variable that takes the nominal value based
on majority religion of the recognizer, parent, and aspirant state. As the literature review showed,
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even secular states’ national identity and domestic institutions are inspired or shaped by their
cultural factors including religion, which influences how a state behaves in international politics.
Henderson (1999) considers ethnicity and religion as the two major cultural factors that shape the
identity of states, irrespective of a state’s official religion, whose primordial causal impact is
relevant in international conflict and foreign policy. Barro and McCleary (2005) studied the role
of majority religion in 188 countries in 1970 and 2000. They imply that the majority religion can
influence how states behave, friendly or less friendly, toward their coreligionist and counterreligionist counterparts. This perception of friendliness or hostility among states is based on the
in-group and out-group identity formation found in “Social Identity Theory”. Their empirical
research demonstrates that “40 percent—75 countries—are classified as having state religions in
2000” while “39 percent of 189 countries—73—had state religions in 1970” (Barro and
McCleary, 2005, p.1334-1335). Therefore, there is ample evidence in the literature to study the
role of religious affinities among states and the casual link between religion and international
recognition. Information about majority religion of recognizer, home, and aspirant states comes
from the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) that collects detailed data on religious
adherence worldwide since 1994.
In the dataset the religion variable is divided into seven categories. The division is based
on the majority religion of each unit under study. The seven categories are Islam, Christianity,
Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Chinse Folk Religion, and Irreligion. This configuration of the
data is made to satisfy the methodological and technical aspects of Logistic Regression Model.
The number of countries falling under each category varies. For instance, a majority of countries
fall under the category of Islam and Christianity while only one country, Israel, is in the Judaism
category.
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As hypothesized in the Theoretical framework and Hypothesis subsection of chapter two,
recognition is more likely to take place when the recognizer and aspirant states have the same
religion that is different than the religion of the parent state. For example, Kosovo is an aspirant
state that is seceded from Serbia. The aspirant is an Islamic state while the parent is a Christian
state. Islamic recognizer states should recognize Kosovo as hypothesized in this study. On the
contrary, recognition is less likely to take place when the recognizer and parent states have the
same religion that is different than the aspirant state. For example, in the case of Kosovo versus
Serbia, Christian states are unlikely to recognize Kosovo because Serbia is a Christian country.
There are other possibilities as well. For example, the religions of all three polities (recognizer,
aspirant, and home states) can align or take an alternative combination; the recognizer state will
have a religion that is not the same as either the parent or aspirant state. Such alternative
combinations are accounted for by assigning specific probability values which are: 0 – unlikely,
1 – likely, 2 – more likely, and 3 – highly likely. A detailed coding of this variable is presented
in Appendix A.
The literature shows that the motivations of states to recognize aspirant states are diverse.
In order to account for alternative explanations a number of control variables are included in this
study. These variables and their operationalization is presented below.

Control Variables
In order to accurately establish the internal validity and explanatory power of the causal
relationship between the Independent Variables (IV) and Dependent Variable (DV) several
control variables are included in this study. The control variables account for alternative
explanations of recognition decisions, identify and avoid spurious causal relationship between
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IVs and DV, as well as correctly measure the correlation between explanatory variables and
variable of interest through an avoidance of omitted variable bias (King, Keohane, and Verba,
2012). The chosen control variables will be held constant, as other plausible explanation for the
outcome of DV, to correctly measure the causal effect of IVs over DV (Pollock, 2012).
Explanation for each of the control variables selected for this research are presented below.

Economic development
Economic development is selected as control variable to account for variation in
recognition decisions between rich and poor countries. Operationally rich and poor countries are
defined in terms of their Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (GDPPC). The richer a country the
higher its GDPPC while the poorer the country the lower its GDPPC. Rich and economically
developed countries exhibit a pro-status quo bias and are reluctant to admit new members to the
club of sovereign states than countries with lower gross domestic product (Ker-Lindsay, 2012;
Maoz, 1989; Paquin, 2010). To measure the variation of behavior between wealthy and poor
countries, the GDPPC is used as the main indicator (Mirilovic and Siroky, 2016) to test how rich
and poor states behave, extend, or withhold recognition, when the other three variables are equal.
The source for this variable is the World Bank - World Development Indicators.

Population
The second control variable is raw population of the recognizer, home, and aspirant state.
Aspirant states with substantial population in proportion to the home state draw significantly
more attention of the international community and sovereign states compared to aspirant states
with significantly less population size compared to their home states (Barata, 2011; Badescu,
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2016). Aspirant states that are economically developed and have larger population size are
usually well-organized and actively engage sovereign states to attract international recognition
(Henrikson, 2006). Therefore, it can be argued that states will react differently towards aspirant
states when the population size is significantly larger in proportion to the home states. Will
population size affects states’ decision about recognition when all the three intendent variables
are equal? This will control for the population size. Data for population size comes from World
Bank - World Development Indicators, the United States Central Agency Factbook, and the
extant literature on aspirant states.

Official state religion
Barro and McCleary (2005) showed the existence of a correlation between states’
behavior in international politics and official religion. The identity and behavior of states that
have an official state religion are shaped by the religion of the majority population. Similarly,
states treat their coreligionist counterparts favorably when issues of interest conflict are at stake.
Operationally, a state religion is defined as the religion that a particular state has officially
declared as the established religion of the state through its constitution. Thus, the official state
religion is added to control for variation in recognition decisions among states. Information about
state religion comes from ARDA.

Government regulation of religion
Some countries regulate religious practices and religion in general through official laws,
administrative actions, and policies. Operationally, government regulation of religion is defined
as the “restrictions placed on the practice, profession, or selection of religion" (Grim and Finke,

80

2007, p.636). It is measured by examining constitutions and other official laws of the countries.
Information for this variable comes from ARDA. Building on the definition of Grim and Finke
(2007), ARDA established a database where countries are ranked on scale of 0-10, with 0 being
the least regulation and 10 the most regulation. This variable will account for variation in
recognition decisions, if any, based on the regulation of religion by governments.

Case Selection
The ten cases selected for this research were established in literature review. However, it
is essential to review how the selected cases follow the methodological requirements for case
selection in Large-N quantitative research. This section will also provide brief background
information about each of the ten cases. Information about aspirant states primarily derive from
the existing literature. Scholarship and research focusing on domestic dynamics of aspirant states
is well established in academia. It will serve as the primary source in application, measurement,
and testing of the operationalization characteristics as well selection of cases.
Before delving into the criteria for case selection, it is imperative to review some basic
methodological guidelines for selection of cases in Large-N quantitative analysis. Selection bias
in Large-N quantitative research design is a consequential challenge that can potentially lead to
spurious causal inferences and negatively affect the external validity of the findings and their
generalizability (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig, 2011). To avoid selection bias, a representative
sample of the population, a small quantity of the population that accurately reflects the larger
population or phenomena under study, should be chosen (May, 2002). To further reduce
selection bias and enhance the credibility of case selection, the sample should be randomized.
The randomization happens when two conditions are met. First, each individual or case in the
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population must have equal opportunity to be selected for analysis. Second, the sample chosen
should follow a manner where “each and every possible combination of n cases in the sample has
an equal opportunity to be selected for analysis” (Manheim et al., 2006, p.113). The caveats
about selection bias indicate that random selection of cases is indispensably crucial for the
validity of the interferences made and their generalizability. However, if the prescribed strategies
to minimize selection bias is impossible, purposeful selection of cases is an option. If the latter is
the case, “selection of cases should avoid selecting on the outcome of the variable and on
mediating variables and the proxies” (Toshkov, 2016, p.251). King and colleagues also point out
that when random selection is not available, it is advisable to make sure at least enough variation
on both the outcome variable of interest and on the main explanatory variable is retained if it is
not possible to avoid a selection based on its value (King et al., 1994).
In keeping with the abovementioned case selection guidance, two sets of cases are
selected for this research. First, the observation of recognition decisions by all sovereign states.
Since the unit of analysis is the country-level recognition decisions, all current member states of
the UN are chosen to be analyzed in terms of their recognition decisions. This avoids the
possible methodological shortcomings – selection bias or randomization. The second set of cases
includes a group of aspirant states where the recognition decisions of UN members are cross
examined. As the literature review shows aspirant states constitute a small group of entities. The
entities that fit the working definition of aspirant states are selected. The conceptual and
empirical parameters for selection of cases is based on the working definition of aspirant state,
established in the literature review, and the operationalization indicators of aspirant states –
territory, government, population, capacity for international relations, absent or limited
recognition, two years of existence, and declaration of independence. In order to establish which
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entities meet the criteria for aspirant state, two strategies will be pursued. First, the existing
empirical work in the literature on aspirant states will be used to ascertain that the entities meet
the four criteria of Montevideo Convention. Examining every single aspirant state to establish
the Montevideo Convention criteria is beyond the scope and breadth of this research. Therefore, I
will rely on the empirical findings of previous scholarship. Second, to determine the duration of
existence and declaration of independence, I will rely on the official statements and other
historical documents related to each of the aspirant states.
The existing empirical studies on aspirant states discussed in chapter 2 agree that
Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, Palestine, Somaliland, South Ossetia,
Taiwan, Transnistria, and Western Sahara are recognition-seeking aspirant states that meet the
Montevideo Convention criteria for statehood who attained limited international recognition or
none at all.
The following is brief description of each of the cases and establishes the two additional
criteria, declaration of independence and duration of existence, which are part of the working
definition. Much of the background information about each case derives from nonacademic
sources such as CIA World Factbook, Encyclopedia Britannica, and country reports by the UN
and Freedom House, as well as country profiles by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).

The Republic of Abkhazia
Abkhazia was a sovereign independent principality before it was conquered by and
became part of the Czarist Russian Empire in 1864 until 1917 October Revolution. In 1919
Abkhazia was given autonomous status, which developed into federal republic status in 1921
within the USSR. However, Abkhazia was made united with Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic
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later in the same year in 1921. After the dissolution of the USSR, Georgia adopted again the
Constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic of 1921, without Abkhazia included. On 23
July 1992, the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia adopted their Constitution of 1925, under which
Abkhazia was a sovereign state and subject to international law. An Abkhazian government offer
to restore the pre-1931 mutual treaty was declined by the Georgian government, which replied
on 14 August 1992 with an offensive against Abkhazia that signally failed. Allied troops,
composed of Abkhazians, other non-Kartvelian residents of Abkhazia, and North Caucasian
volunteers, expelled Shevardnadze, the Georgian president at the time, and his fighters. A
ceasefire was reached following the war in 1994. It was followed by establishment of United
Nations Observer Mission and a Russian-led peacekeeping force to prevent future conflict. In
November 1994, Abkhazia first declared independence from Georgia and set up its own
government, and Vladislav Ardzinba became president. Abkhazia again officially declared
independence from Georgia in 1999. The declaration was denied by Georgia and it received no
international recognition. In August 2008, Abkhaz forces allied with Russia in the RussoGregorian War that annulled the 1994 ceasefire between Abkhazia and Georgia. Russia officially
recognized Abkhazia in 2008. The same year, Georgian parliament declared Abkhazia as a
Russian-occupied territory. Abkhazia had a population of 240,705 and a GDP of USD
722,115,000 in 2011. Abkhazia’s capital is Sukhumi. The official languages of Abkhazia are
Abkhazia and Russian. 90% of Abkhazia identify themselves as Christian while 10% Muslim. It
covers 8,660 square kilometers (3,340 sq. mi). In addition to Russia, three members of the UN
recognize Abkhazia, which are Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru. Abkhazia is also recognized
by Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria—unrecognized aspirant states
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themselves. Abkhazia has unofficial diplomatic relations with four UN member states of Belarus,
Eritrea, Syria, and Turkey.

Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)
Saharan Arab Democratic Republic also known as Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is
a self-declared state that claims control over disputed territory of Western Sahara that is
presently occupied by Morocco. SADR declared independence in 1976 and was recognized by
80 UN member states following four decades of its independence. 39 states have withdrawn or
frozen their independence. It is currently recognized by 45 UN member states. African Union
admitted SADR as a member which was followed by Morocco’s protest and leaving the Union.
Morocco however rejoined AU in 2017. According to the SADR foreign ministry website, it has
attended the Non-Allied Movement or the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership meetings as
a guest. According to the World Bank SADR had a population of 554,000 people, in territory
under its direct control, and a GDP of USD 1,385,000,002 in 2011. SADR’s claimed capital is
El-Aaiun while its current capital is Tifariti. The official languages of SADR are Arabic and
Spanish. Islam is the predominate religion of SADR residents. The Western Sahara region was a
colony of Spain from 1884 until 1976. Upon Spanish withdrawal, the Polisario Front (PF), a
military and political organization based in Algeria, declared independence, and established a
government in exile. The Polisario Front is composed of Saharawis and nomadic people of the
Western Sahara. Upon Spanish withdrawal both Morocco and Mauritania laid claim to 75% of
the territory PF claimed as part of its territory. PF fought both Morocco and Mauritania for the
territory. In 1979 Mauritania abandoned its territorial claim and made peace with PF. Morocco,
however, annexed the territory abandoned by Mauritania. FP fought a 16-year guerilla war
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against Morocco that ended with a UN-brokered ceasefire. Since then, FP and Morocco are in a
frozen conflict status over the territory. Morocco has postponed several attempted referendums
in the region to decide the territorial claims.

Republic of Kosovo
Kosovo covers an area of 10,908 square kilometers (4,212 Sq. mi) in the Balkan
peninsula. Its capital is Pristina. It had a population of 1,791,1000 people and GDP of USD
6,649,291,076 in 2011, according to the UN and the World Bank. According to Kosovo’s
constitution, Albanian and Serbian are the official languages. It is a secular state with no official
state religion. About 95% of Kosovars identify as Muslim while the remaining are Christian and
other religious minorities. Kosovo is a multiparty parliamentary representative democratic
republic. According to its constitution the country is governed by the legislative, executive, and
judicial institutions.
Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. As of 2018, it
is recognized by 113 UN member states. Serbia claims Kosovo as part of its territory and
rejected its independence. Kosovo is member of several international organizations including the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). Kosovo was a province of the
Serbian republic of the larger former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). After the
dissolution of SFRY in 1990s the region was marred by several conflicts and nationalistic
movements. SFRY was made of up of several republics such as Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia as well as two autonomous provinces
within Serbia—Vojvodina and Kosovo. All the republics gained independence following the
breakup of SFRY while Kosovo remained part of Serbia. The Albanian Kosovars demanded
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independence, but Serbia responded to separatist pressure by launching a brutal crackdown on
the territory's Albanian population. The Kosovo Liberation Army fought Serbian forces led by
Slobodan Milosevic that resulted in a war of independence from about 1998 through 1999. The
United Nations Security Council passed a resolution in 1999 ending the war and a peacekeeping
force of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was deployed, which provided some
autonomy for Kosovo. Following the end of the war, Serbian forces withdrew from Kosovo and
a UN sponsored administration took over control of Kosovo. In February of 2008, the Kosovo
Assembly unanimously voted to declare independence from Serbia.

Nagorno-Karabakh (RNK)
The Republic of Artsakh also commonly known as Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh
(RNK) is a self-proclaimed secessionist aspirant state in the South Caucus region. The old
autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast was part of Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist
Republic that occupied an area of about 1,700 square miles (4,400 square km) while about 2,700
square miles (7,000 square km), bigger than its previous territory, is currently under the control
of RNK. RNK’s capital is Stepanakert. RNK is a unitary presidential republic and the executive
branch is headed by a president who is both head of the government and the state. RNK’s
unicameral National Assembly constitutes its legislature. Both the president and members of
National Assembly are directly elected by the people. According to the UN and WB, RNK had a
population of 294,906 people and a total GDP of USD 4,507,638,386 in 2011. The population of
RNK is 95% ethnic Armenians and 5% other minorities that include Azerbaijanis, Russians,
Assyrians, Ukrainians, Georgians, and other minorities. Majority of the population is Christian,
and the official language is Armenian.
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The area was incorporated into the USSR as an autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast
within the Azerbaijan SSR in 1923. Following the decay of USSR, the tensions between ethnic
Azeris and Armenians started to raise and exploded into violence when the region’s parliament
voted to join Armenia – another USSR republic. In 1988 Azerbaijani troops and ethnic Armenian
separatists warred over control of the territory. For the next few years, ethnic Armenians gained
control of the region and also pushed on to occupy Azerbaijani territory outside Karabakh,
creating a buffer zone linking Karabakh and Armenia. In 1991 a referendum took place in the
neighboring Shahumain region resulting in declaration of independence, which reignited the
ethnic conflict from 1991 through 1994 when a truce was signed between the two sides leaving
Nagorno-Karabakh a de facto independent state. Negotiations have so far failed to produce a
permanent peace agreement, and the dispute remains unresolved. Although Armenia is
considered the main patron state of RNK, it has not officially recognized RNK as an independent
state. RNK is not recognized by any UN member state, only a few other aspirant states such as
Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. However, RNK has unofficial diplomatic
representative offices in Washington DC, Armenia, France, Germany, Russia, Lebanon, and
Australia.

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)
TRNC is an aspirant state that comprises the northeastern part of the island of Cyprus.
The state covers 3,355 km2 (1,295 sq. mi) and had of 294,906 people and a GDP of USD
4,507,638,210 in 2011. While the overwhelming majority of TRNC population identify as
Muslim, it has a secular state. TRNC’s capital is North Nicosia. TRNC is a semi-presidential
representative democratic republic. Prime minister heads the government while president is head
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of the state. The executive power is exercised by the government and the legislative power by the
Assembly of the Republic. TRNC’s judicial branch is independent of government and the
legislature. The island gained its independence from British rule in 1960. A constitutional powersharing was established in 1960 based on which the Greek Cypriots secured 35 seats in the
parliament and the post of the president. The Turkish Cypriots secured 15 seats and the post of
the vice president. The president and the vice president had the veto powers in issues related to
foreign policy and security. Turkey invaded the island after a coup d’état in 1974 that attempted
to annex the island to Greece. The crisis resulted in relocation of Greek Cypriots from the north
and the Turkish Cypriots form the south to the north and effectively partitioned the island along
ethnic lines. Thus, TRNC was established which unilaterally declared independence from the
Republic of Cyprus in 1983. The Republic of Cyprus and the UN called the declaration of
independence legally invalid. The republic of Cyprus still lays claim on the TRNC and considers
it occupied by Turkey. TRNC is recognized only by Turkey as a sovereign state. Before the
partition the island was marred in interethnic and intercommunal conflict. As the conflicts
continued, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 186 in March 1964, which called for the
creation of a UN Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus. This led to the United Nations Buffer Zone,
known as Green Line, which divided the island along ethnic line. Despite TRNC being
recognized only by one UN member, it has unofficial representative offices in several countries
such as USA, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Oman, the United Arab
Emirates, Qatar, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
TRNC has an official embassy in Turkey and several consulates across major cities in Turkey.
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The State of Palestine
Palestine is a borderline case of an aspirant state for three reasons. First, the division of
the Palestinian territory into two sections; West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Second, the restriction
and disputed control of the Palestinian state over the territory it claims. Third, Palestine is not a
secessionist state. It is not seceding from Israel. Instead, it is laying claim over territories that
were assigned to Palestinians after the UN partition of the land. However, Israel can be
considered a proxy home state, because of Palestine’s struggle to retrieve control over its
territory occupied by Israel. These complications will be further clarified when outlining the
historical events preceding the declaration of independence by Palestine. For now, like other
cases, a brief introduction of the state of Palestine in its current territory and status is presented.
The state of Palestine is a de jure sovereign state covering a total area of 6,220 square
kilometers or 2,401sq.mi (Gaza Strip totals 360 Sq. km and West Bank totals 5,860 Sq.km), and
had a population of 3,927,1000 people and a GDP of USD 10,465,400,00 in 2011 (World Bank
Data). 93% of the population is Muslim followed by 6% Christians and 1% Druze and
Samaritans (Morland, 2016). Arabic is the official language of Palestine. Jerusalem is its
designated capital though its administrative center is in the city of Ramallah. The Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) was established in 1964 as an umbrella organization that
coordinated several political and military organizations engaged in military and political struggle
for the liberation of Palestinian lands and establishment of a viable state for Palestinians. In 1993
Israel and PLO signed the Gaza-Jericho Agreement that established the Palestinian National
Authority (PNA) which is the basis for the current government of Palestine. The Palestinian
government or the Palestinian authority operates within a semi-presidential multiparty republic
framework. The legislative power is vested in the Palestinian Legislative Council. Its members
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are elected by Palestinians residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The executive power is
exercised by the prime minister who is appointed by the president. The latter is elected through
popular vote. PNA is in a temporary status, thus, Palestine does not have an established
constitution or independent judicial branch. The legislative and executive branches established a
court system and laws that govern the territories.
The region covering current Gaza, West Bank, Jerusalem, and the state of Israel, has been
a troublesome area for decades. The region covering today’s Palestinian territories and the state
of Israel was inhibited by a multicultural population with 86% Muslims followed by 10%
Christians and 4% Jews in the 19th century (Encyclopedia Britannica). However, the IsraelPalestine conflict and the struggle for Palestinian statehood started after WWI. In 1917 Britain
took over the region from the Ottomans and the first wave of Jewish immigration to the region
started following the Balfour Declaration. The declaration supported creation of a homeland for
the Jewish people and emphasized that the existing population should not be denied their civil
and religious rights. In 1920, the San Remo Allied Powers conference granted Palestine to
Britain as a mandate to prepare the region for self-rule. The same year, several riots took place in
Jerusalem against the Balfour Declaration in support of Palestinian Arab identity. Inter-ethnic
tensions and communal conflict, often resulting in causalities by the hundreds, grew over the
following years as mass immigration continued. Several Arab revolts took place between 1936
through 1939 in the British Mandatory Palestine. In response to these revolts, the British
Government adopted a new policy called the “White Paper of 1939”. The policy rejected
partitioning of the mandatory Palestine, proposed establishment of a Jewish national home and
an independent Palestinian state within ten years. The policy also limited Jewish immigration to
75,000 for five years and placed restriction on Jews buying land from Arabs (Trevor, 1980).
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However, the policy did not materialize as it was opposed by both Arab and Jewish population of
the region. Thus, Guerilla fights, riots, and violent conflicts over land resulting in relocation of
indigenous population continued until 1940s.
In 1947, a UN partition plan divided the land and recommended creation of independent
Arab and Jewish states and a special international regime for control of the city of Jerusalem and
its environs. In 1947, the Mandatory Palestine had a population that was estimated to be 30%
Jewish and 70% Palestinian. The Jewish population owned 7% of the land while Palestinians
owned 93%. The UN partition plan allocated 43% of the Mandatory Palestine to Palestinians and
57 % for the Jewish state (Khalidi, 1997, p.9-14). The Jewish population accepted the plan, but it
was refused by the Arabs. In 1948, a war broke out that ended with the Israeli victory and control
over 78% of the land. West Bank came under control of Jordan while Gaza Strip under Egypt.
The war resulted in mass exodus of the indigenous Arab population who escaped or were
forcefully expelled by Israel.
In 1967, Israel launched a pre-emptive attack against Egypt. Jordan and Syria were drawn
into the war. The Six Day War ended with Israel capturing the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan
Heights from Syria, and the Sinai Peninsula. In the1950s Yasser Arafat, a Palestinian Arab,
started a guerilla war out of Egypt against Israel. Arafat latter became leader of the PLO
established by Arab League in 1964. In 1973 another war broke out between Egypt and Israel
that was followed by a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Sinai came under control of Egypt.
In 1974 PLO adopted a 10-point program including compromise with Israel and demanding
control over historic Palestinian lands. In 1982 Egypt withdrew from Gaza and Jordan withdrew
from the West Bank in 1988. Following these two events PLO officially declared the
independence of the State of Palestine in November 1988 as a government in exile in Algeria. 80
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countries recognized the new state of Palestine by the end of the same year. By mid-1989,
Palestinian state was recognized by 94 states (Khader, 2014). The new state of Palestine has
abandoned its claim over the entire territory. Instead, the Palestine state claims sovereignty over
territories based on borders of June 1967 that include West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem
which constituted Arab territories before the Six Day War.
In 1993, the Oslo Accord was signed between PLO and Israel resulting in formation of
the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) which would govern areas A and B in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip. West Bank at its current status is divided into three administrative sections.
Palestine fully controls one that covers less than 20% of the territory. The second section
covering another 20% of the territory is dividedly controlled. Israel controls security while
Palestinians have the civil control. The third section covering 60% of the West Bank is under
Israeli control. When Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, it came under the control of Hamas – a
radical group involved in terrorism and armed resistance against Israel. In its current status, the
Palestinian state is recognized by 136 UN member states. Palestine started a campaign to gain
full membership status in the UN in 2009. In 2011 Palestine submitted its application for full
membership in the UN. The move was opposed by Israel and her allies including USA, which
has veto power in the UN Security Council. The efforts to gain full membership failed. However,
in 2012, it became a non-member observer state in the United Nations. The state of Palestine is a
member of the Arab League, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), G77 and the
International Olympic Committee.
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Republic of Somaliland
Somaliland is a self-educated state, with Hargeisa as its capital, and internationally
known as an autonomous region of Somalia. Somaliland covers an area of 176,120 square
kilometers (68,000 Sq. mi). UN and WB reported its population around 3,500,000 people and
GDP of USD 1,400,000,000 in 2011. Majority of the population practice Islam. The official
languages of Somaliland are Somali, Arabic, and English. Somaliland is not recognized by any
of the UN member states. Somaliland has a working political system, government institutions,
police force and its own currency. Somaliland is a presidential constitutional republic. The
executive branch is headed by a president. The Somaliland parliament exercise legislative
powers that is made of two chambers; the upper house also known as House of Elders and the
lower house known as House of Representatives. Both the president and parliament members are
appointed through elections. According to the Somaliland constitution, the country has an
independent judiciary headed by the Supreme Court. The judiciary has a three-level court
system; the primary, secondary, and Supreme Court.
The European empires divided the Horn of Arica among themselves. The area known as
Somaliland came under the British control. Somaliland became independent in June 1960. The
same year the Trust Territory of Somalia, under the control of Italy, gained independence. The
two territories formed the Somali Republic. The newly emerged Somali Republic underwent
several domestic conflicts and political crises in the decades following its formation. In the
1990s the Somali government led by Siad Barre cracked down on rebels based in Hargeisa that
wanted to separate and form an independent Somaliland. In 1991 the movement of Barre
collapsed, and the Hargeisa based separatists, known as Somali National Movement, unilaterally
declared independence from Somali and reinstated the borders of the formerly short-lived
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independent state of Somaliland. In 2001, local authorities held a referendum to affirm its newly
drafted constitution and its independence from Somalia. Though Somaliland is not recognized
internationally, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) made its goal to campaign for
international recognition. Somaliland MFA manages international trade and facilitates foreign
investment in the country. It has signed strategic agreement with Ethiopia and United Arab
Emirates (UAE) to improve trade relations and infrastructure. Somaliland has established
unofficial diplomatic missions in several countries. It has representative offices in UAE,
Ethiopia, South Africa, Sweden, Italy, and USA. Denmark has established a political office in
Hargeisa. Ethiopia has its embassy in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, however, it has
established a consulate office in Hargeisa headed by a diplomatic with the rank of an
ambassador. Somaliland issues passwords to its citizens which are recognized by eight countries
including South Africa, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Belgium, France, South Sudan, and Kenya.

Republic of South Ossetia (RSO)
Republic of South Ossetia, also known as Tskhinvali Region, is a self-declared separatist
state in the South Caucasus within the northern part of the Republic of Georgia. The state covers
an area of 3,900 square kilometers (1,500 sq. mi) and its capital is Tskhinvali. According to the
UN and WB, RSO had a population of 54,000 people and a GDP of USD 13,500,000 in 2011.
The RSO constitution establishes the republic as a semi-presidential republic. Executive power is
exercised by president who is head of the state. The president is elected through popular vote and
in turn appoints a prime minster. RSO has a unicameral parliament whose members are elected
through popular vote. The official languages of RSO are Ossetian and Russian. Majority of
Ossetians are Christian while a small minority practices Islam and neopaganism.
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South Ossetia declared itself as an independent state in 1920, but it did not last long as it
was incorporated into the USSR in 1922. It gained autonomous oblast status as part of the
Socialist Republic of Georgia within the USSR. In the 1980s a separatist movement emerged in
South Ossetia seeking secession from Georgia and unification with North Ossetia, which is now
part of Russia. Following dissolution of the USSR, Georgia gained independence in 1991,
claiming the region as part of its territory. South Ossetia declared independence in December of
1991. The disagreement turned into armed conflict between Ossetian and Georgian forces.
Russia brokered a ceasefire in 1992 and the parties agreed to establish a peacekeeping force
consist of military forces of Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia, and North Ossetia. South Ossetia
continued to declare itself independent from Georgia and approved a constitution in 1993
establishing itself as a republic. Negotiations to resolve the conflict over sovereignty failed and
both sides engaged in sporadic fights. The armed conflict escalated in 2004 and again in 2008;
the latter involved Russian intervention. After a week of clashes between Ossetian and Georgian
forces, Russian forces entered the conflict backing South Ossetians. Following the RussoGeorgian War, Russia officially recognized South Ossetia as an independent state. Six UN
member states recognized RSO that include Russia, Nicaragua, Vanuatu, Tuvalu, Syria, and
Venezuela. RSO is also recognized by a few aspirant states such as Abkhazia, Sahrawi
Democratic Republic, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

96

Republic of China – Taiwan
Taiwan is a borderline case of an aspirant state due to its unique historical development
and ambiguity over its lack of official declaration of independence. It meets all the criteria of the
working definition except official declaration of independence, yet it is added to the list of cases
for two reasons. First, it is considered an aspirant state in the literature. Second, it meets most of
the working definition criteria, and showed a reluctance to join mainland China and become part
of the Peoples Republic of China. The historical development of Taiwan is different than the rest
of the nine cases. Following the end of World War II, Chinese nationalists took control of
Taiwan and parts of mainland China in 1945. A civil war broke out between Chinese
communists, occupying most of the mainland China, and the Chinese nationalists. The
communists defeated the nationalists in 1949 and established the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) on the mainland China while the nationalist forces fled to Taiwan and established
Republic of China (ROC) claiming jurisdiction over Taiwan and the rest of mainland China. The
international community considered ROC as the legal representative of China, gaining
international recognition from several countries, admittance to the UN, and securing a permanent
seat in the UN Security Council until 1970s. In the early 1970s, relations between China and the
USA improved. The UN membership of ROC and UN Security Council were switched to PRC.
The international recognition of PRC by several countries resulted in withdrawal of recognition
from ROC. However, several countries still recognize ROC as an independent state. PRC, on the
other hand, regards Taiwan as rebel region that must reunite with the mainland China. Taiwan
has not declared independence because it considers itself as China. However, following the end
of martial law in 1987, the Taiwanese independent movement as emerged. Taiwan meets all
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criteria of the aspirant state except formal declaration of independence. Toomla (2014) justifies
inclusion of Taiwan to the list of aspirant states as below:
There are secessionist tendencies in the country and independence has been a subject of
heated debate. There are positions that emphasize democracy and the attributes of
statehood and call for the recognition of an independent Taiwan (Otopalik, 2006). There
are also views opposed to independence (Yazhou, 2007), mostly from mainland China….
Surveys show that the idea of Taiwanese independence is popular and, according to
some, it has received support from over 50% of respondents (Wang, 2012). This can be
interpreted as Taiwan at least thinking about independence from China, about creating a
separate state. (P.76).

Taiwan covers an area of 36,197 square kilometers (13,976 Sq. mi) and its capital is
Taipei. According to the WB, Taiwan had a population of 23,224,912 people and a GDP of USD
485,679,359,724 in 2011. Mandarin is the official language of Taiwan. Majority, about 90%, of
Taiwanese practice some of form Buddhism. The remaining 10% include adherents of
Christianity and other minority religions. Taiwan is officially recognized by 17 UN member
states. 114 UN member states withdrew their recognition of Taiwan after recognition PRC. The
political and legal statuses of Taiwan are a contentious issue. Taiwan has its own constitution,
armed forces, and independent judicial system.

Transnistria (PMR)
Transnistria also known as Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) is a self-declared
separatist state seeking secession from Moldova since 1992. PMR covers an area of 4,163 square
kilometers (1,607 sq. mi) which is a narrow strip of land between the Dniester River and the
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Ukrainian border. Its population and GDP in 2011 were reported as 523,000 people and USD
1,000,000,000 by WB. The PMR population is made up of several ethnic groups with 34%
Russians, 32% Moldovans, 30% Ukrainians, and 4% Bulgarians. Majority of PMR inhabitants
identify as Christian. The official languages of PMR are Russian, Ukrainian, and Moldovan. The
largest city and capital is Tiraspol. PMR is a semi-presidential republic. The executive powers
are exercised by the government and the parliament. The president and parliament members are
elected through popular vote. President is head of the state while a prime minister heads the
government. Parliament is a unicameral body, called the Supreme Council, which exercises
legislative powers and is involved in executive powers as the prime minister is chosen by the
majority in the parliament. According to the PMR constitution, the judicial branch is independent
of the executive and the legislative branches.
In 1922, the area now constituting PMR became part of the Moldovan autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic (SSR) within the Ukrainian SSR. After World War II PMR, with some degree
of autonomy, became part of the newly formed Moldovan SSR of the USSR until early 1990. In
September of 1990, the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic unilaterally
proclaimed as a Soviet Republic separate from Moldova in the second Congress of the Peoples'
Representatives of Pridnestrovian. However, the proclamation was soon denied by the USSR
headquarters and PMR came under control of the SSR of Moldova. The arrangement did not last
long as in August 1991, the supreme council ruling PMR declared independence from Moldova
and proclaimed PMR as an independent state. The same year, Moldova declared its
independence from USSR and claimed PMR as part of its own territory. Moldova was admitted
to the UN as an independent state in 1992, and UN considers PMR to be part of Moldova.
Moldova took military action against PMR separatists attacking police and military units of the
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PMR. The conflict escalated as Russian troops intervened to aid the PMR forces. PMR with help
of the Russia forces has solidified its control over the territory it claims. The military conflict
ended as a result of ceasefire agreement signed on July 21, 1992. PMR is not recognized by any
UN member states, only three aspirant states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and NagornoKarabakh. According to the Foreign Affairs Ministry of PMR (FAM-PMR), Russia has opened a
consulate office in Tiraspol. The three aspirant states that recognize PMR have also established
representative offices in Tiraspol.

Conclusion
This chapter outlined the research strategy, methodological approach, data collection and
reconfiguration, operationalization of variables, and placed the case selection within the
appropriate case selection methodological context. This research is limited to testing three
variables namely vulnerability, regime type, and religion. The temporal range is limited to 2011.
The spatial range is limited to studying recognition of aspirant states by all UN member states.
The Logistic Regression is chosen for testing the hypothesis due to binary value of dependent
variable. This study is restricted to studying recognition of the ten selected cases by all the UN
member. The ten aspirant states that meet the working definition are Abkhazia, Kosovo,
Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, Palestine, Taiwan, Transnistria, South Ossetia,
Somaliland, and Western Sahara. The data and information for the project derives from the
existing databases and the literature. This chapter also provided brief background information
about each of the selected cases. The next chapter provides discussion of the results and analysis.
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CHAPTER 4:
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Introduction
This chapter presents key findings of the statistical model and a discussion of the results.
The statistical model tests five hypotheses. The first hypothesis examines whether states
vulnerable to domestic separatism will grant or withhold recognition to an aspirant state.
Recognizer states susceptible to domestic separatism are hypothesized as less likely to recognize
an aspirant state. The second and third hypotheses evaluate whether free and partly free countries
recognize an aspirant state that is more democratic than its parent state. Furthermore, free and
partly free countries are expected to avoid granting recognition to an aspirant state if the parent
state is comparatively more democratic than the aspirant state. The fourth and fifth hypotheses
examine whether states make recognition decisions based on religious affinities. States are
expected to recognize an aspirant state when the recognizer and aspirant states have the same
religion that is different than the religion of the parent state. On the contrary, when parent and
recognizer states have the same religion that is different than the aspirant, it is unlikely for
recognition to take place. The research design (chapter 3) and coding rules (Appendix A)
account for alternative combinations; when the religions of all three entities (recognizer, aspirant,
and home states) align, variegate, and or take an entirely different shape.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The results section reports results of findings of the
statistical model and whether the results support or reject the proposed hypotheses. The
discussion section focuses on interpretation of results and how they relate to the research
questions as well as entails a contrast and comparison of the results with prior studies.
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Results
The unit of analysis is the country level recognition decision. This thesis examined
recognition of ten cases of aspirant states (Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern
Cyprus, Palestine, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Taiwan, Transnistria, and Western Sahrawi) by the
193 UN member states through a Large-N quantitative research analysis. The statistical model of
Logistic Regression, also called Logit Model, is chosen due to the binary outcome of the
dependent variable: recognition vs. non-recognition. The first independent variable,
vulnerability, is dichotomous; domestic separatism exists, or domestic separatism is not present.
For the second independent variable, regime type, recognizer states are divided into two groups
and coded Free and Partly Free. For the third variable, religious affinities, the recognizer
countries are divided into seven categories based on majority religion of their population—Islam,
Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Chinse Folk Religion, and Irreligion. The following
results were obtained after running the Logistic Regression Model on the data.
Table 4:1 Results of Logit Regression

(Intercept)
Recog_F
Recog_PF
Vulnerability
Recog_Christ
Recog_Islam
Recog_Gov_Reg_Religion
Aspiring dummy
Abkhazia
Kosovo
Nagorno-Karabakh
Northern Cyprus
Palestine
Somaliland
South Ossetia
Taiwan
Transnistria

Estimate
-0.5627
0.7477
0.4822
-0.3699
-0.3660
0.7774
0.0012

Std. Error
0.3784
0.1631
0.1504
0.1846
0.1496
0.1560
0.0388

z value
-1.49
4.58
3.21
-2.00
-2.45
4.98
0.03

Pr(>)
0.1370
0.0000
0.0013
0.0452
0.0144
0.0000
0.9754

-3.5801
-0.4675
-17.8996
-5.6249
1.7866
-19.9985
-2.6313
-3.0252
-18.3322

0.5821
0.3508
770.3275
1.0602
0.2423
747.0770
0.5353
0.6139
769.4135

-6.15
-1.33
-0.02
-5.31
7.37
-0.03
-4.92
-4.93
-0.02

0.0000
0.1826
0.9815
0.0000
0.0000
0.9786
0.0000
0.0000
0.9810
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The first hypothesis measures the causal relationship between vulnerable states and
recognition of aspirant states. The first hypothesis is restated below:
•

H1: States with separatist challenges of their own are less likely to recognize aspirant
states.

After running the statistical model, there was evidence to support this hypothesis about
vulnerability. As the results show the relationship is statistically significant with a coefficient of
(-0.3699). The vulnerability variable has a Z-value of (-2.00) and a P-value of (0.0452). The
direction of the relationship between independent and dependent variables is negative. States
facing a domestic separatist movement were expected not to recognize an aspirant state. Thus,
the evidence supports the hypothesis. This suggests that states vulnerable to domestic separatism
are less likely to recognize an aspirant state.
The second and third hypotheses measure the relationship between democratic states, or level
of freedom, and recognition of aspirant states. Based on the categorization of democracies into
Free and Partly Free by the Freedom House, two variables were created; free and partly free
states. The two hypotheses testing the causal relationship between recognition and level of
democracy are restated below.
•
•

H2: Democratic states are more likely to recognize an aspirant state when the aspirant
state is more democratic than the home state.
H3: Democratic states are less likely to recognize an aspirant state when the home state
is more democratic than the aspirant state.

The test results support both hypotheses. The results for the free countries variable
(Recong_F) demonstrate that the relationship is real and statistically significant with a coefficient
of (0.7477), a Z-value of (4.58), and P-value of (0.00001). This variable strictly measured
recognition of aspirant states by free recognizer states based on the comparative level of
democracy among aspirant and parent states. A free recognizer state was predicted to recognize
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an aspirant state, if the aspirant state had a higher score of freedom compared to its parent states.
Alternatively, a free recognizer state was predicted to not recognize an aspirant state if the parent
state was comparatively more democratic and had a higher score of freedom. The direction of the
relationship between independent and dependent variables is positive; when the aspirant state has
a higher score of freedom compared to its parent state, the probability of recognition by free
recognizer states increases. The variable measuring recognition by free states (Recog_F) captures
the behavior of a free state towards aspirant state based on the comparative freedom scores
between aspirant and parent states. The research design (chapter 3) and coding rules (Appendix
A) address alternative combinations; when the freedom scores of all three entities (recognizer,
aspirant, and home states) align, variegate, and or take a completely different form. There are
different probability values assigned to each alternative combination. The variable (Recog_F)
captures the cumulative results for all such variegated combinations.
The second variable (Recog_PF) examined recognition decisions by the partly free states.
The previous variable pertinent to level of democracy (Recog_F) examined recognition decisions
by states that are categorized as Free States by the Freedom House ranking of democracy. The
Recog_PF variable examined recognition of aspirant states by states categorized as Partly Free
by Freedom House. Like to the free states, this variable (Recog_PF) measuring recognition by
partly free states captures the behavior of a partly free state towards aspirant state based on the
comparative freedom scores between aspirant and parent states. The research design (chapter 3)
and coding rules (Appendix A) address alternative combinations; when the freedom scores of all
three entities (recognizer, aspirant, and home states) align, variegate, and or take a completely
different form. There are different probability values assigned to each alternative combination.
The variable (Recog_PF) captures the cumulative results for all such variegated combinations.
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The direction of the relationship between independent and dependent variable (partly free
states and recognition) is positive; when the aspirant state has a higher score of freedom
compared to its parent state, the probability of recognition by partly free recognizer states
increases. The empirical results showed the relationship was statistically significant with the
coefficient of (04822), a Z-value of (3.21), and a positive P-value of (0.0013).
According to the empirical results both hypotheses 2 and 3 are true; states categorized as
Free and Partly Free were more likely to support recognition of aspirant states that are
comparatively freer than their parent states. On the other hand, free and partly free states did not
recognize aspirant states whose parent states are comparatively more democratic and free.
Therefore, the empirical evidence supported the logic behind the second and third hypotheses.
However, the size of the impact differed among the free and partly free countries. The absolute
value of coefficient for free countries (Recog_F) is (0/7477) while the absolute coefficient value
for partly free countries (Recog_PF) stands at (.04822). Thus, it shows that the size of impact of
free countries is greater than the partly free.
The two remaining hypotheses are about the relationship between religious affinities and
recognition. The hypotheses generated for the religion variable are restated below.
•
•

H4: Aspirant states are more likely to gain recognition when aspirant and recognizer
states have similar religion.
H5: Aspirant states are less likely to gain recognition when the home state and the
recognizer states have the same religion.

The primary argument of the religion variable has a trinary logic. The literature review and
the theoretical framework analysis revealed that a recognizer will gravitate towards its
coreligionist when the home and aspirant states have different religions. Thus, the recognizer, as
hypothesized, will recognize an aspirant state whose religion is the same as the recognizer and
different than the home state. Alternatively, a recognizer will not recognize an aspirant state
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when the recognizer and home states have similar religion that is different than the aspirant state.
The two variables (Recog_Christ and Recog_Islam) captures the religions of recognizer,
aspirant, and home states. The research design (chapter 3) and coding rules (Appendix A)
address alternative combinations; when the religion of all three entities (recognizer, aspirant, and
home states) align, variegate, and or take a completely different combined form. There are
different probability values assigned to each alternative combination. The two variables
(Recog_Christ and Recog_Islam)) capture the cumulative results for all such variegated
combinations.
As previously stated in the research design chapter, the recognizer countries were divided
into seven groups of countries based on the majority religion. These included Islam, Christianity,
Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Chinese Folk Religion, and Irreligion. This configuration of data
was essential to satisfy the technical and methodological adjustments needed for logit regression
model. Some groups of countries were dropped from the statistical model due to limited number
of countries. Only three countries fell under the Hinduism category, one for Judaism, one under
Irreligion group. All groups except Christianity and Islam had fewer than five countries. Thus,
the results only show the results for Christian and Islamic countries.
The results for the Christian countries variable demonstrate that the relationship is real and
statistically significant with coefficient (-0.3660), a Z-value of (-2.45), and a P-value of (0.0144).
The Z-value (-2.45) has a negative sign while the hypothesis predicted a positive direction for the
relationship. Thus, the evidence does not support the hypothesis. In other words, the evidence
suggests the opposite to be true.
The results for Islamic countries are different than the Christian countries. The results
demonstrate that the relationship between the independent and dependent variables is both
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statistically significant and real with a coefficient value of (0.7774), a Z-value of (4.98), and Pvalue of (0.00001). The Z-value is positive confirming the hypothesized positive direction of the
relationship.
The final part of the religion variable compares the impact size of each of the two variables
(Christian vs Islamic countries). The absolute coefficient value for the Christian countries is (.3660) while it is (0.7774) for the Islamic countries. The results suggest that religion plays a
significant role in recognition decision among Islamic countries. Also, the impact of religion is
greater among Islamic countries compared to the Christian countries.
Four control variables were included in this study to gauge alternative potential factors that
might affect states’ recognition decisions. The first control variable, government regulation of
religion, examined whether there was a causal relationship between recognition and the level of
regulations placed on religion among the recognizer states. The government regulation of
religious is operationally defined as “restrictions placed on the practice, profession, or selection
of religion" (Grim and Finke, 2007, p.636). The previous four variables (Recog_P, Recog_PF,
Recog_Christ, and Recog_Islam) examined the levels of democracy and religious affinities
between the recognizer, aspirant, and home states. However, this variable only focuses on
government regulation of religion among recognizer states and whether it impacted recognition
decisions of the recognizer. Data for this variable comes from ARDA. Building on the definition
of Grim and Finke (2007), ARDA ranks countries on a scale of 0-10, with 0 being the least
regulation and 10 the most regulation.
The primary logic behind this control variable is as follows. 1) When the recognizer and
aspirant states have the same religion that is different than the home state, the recognizer state
with higher score of government regulation of religion is more likely to recognize the aspirant
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state. 2) When the recognizer and home state have the same religion that is different than the
aspirant state; the recognizer with higher score of government regulation of religion is less likely
to recognize the aspirant state. The coding rules (Appendix A) provides detail coding of this
variable whose cumulative value is captured in Recog_Gov_Reg_Religion variable as appears in
the results (Table:4.1).
The results show that this variable is not statistically significant with the coefficient value of
(0,0012), a Z-value of (0.03), and a P-value of (0.9754). The direction of the variable was
positive, and the Z-value has a positive sign. This implies there is a relationship in theory, but it
is statistically insignificant.
The remaining three control variables – population, official state religion, GDP per capita –
were excluded from the statistical model. These variables were excluded due to unanticipated
challenges that emerged during the study and methodological limitations. A more detailed
explanation for exclusion of these variables is presented in the Discussion subsection of this
chapter and further discussed in the Limitations and recommendation for future research
subsection of chapter five.
In addition to the main scores for the independent variables, the results as Table: 4.1 shows
also include scores for each of the ten cases. The coefficients of the cases relate to a technical
aspect of the model. Though the scores for each individual case are important for validity of the
model, they hold no interpretative value. Therefore, the fixed effects were included in the model
but are not shown due to lack of substantive value.
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Discussion
This study set out to investigate what shapes the incentives of states to extend or withhold
recognition to an aspirant state. A multitude of factors were identified as crucial explanations
behind states’ recognition decisions. Among them three factors are less rigorously explored,
under-researched, undertheorized, and or found to have inconclusive conclusions about their
causal effects on recognition. These were vulnerability, regime type, and religion. This research
suggested and hypothesized that states vulnerable to domestic secession were unlikely to extend
recognition to an aspirant state. This Large-N, cross-national empirical study answers one of the
secondary research questions--do states, domestically vulnerable to secession, recognize aspirant
states? The answer is negative as the study gives evidence in support of the vulnerability
proposition.
The empirical results reinforce the previous findings about vulnerability. Some scholars
studied the vulnerability factors in regional contexts such as Africa and Eastern Europe, arguing
states usually refrain from supporting and recognizing aspirant states. These states were
compelled to be cautious, because extending recognition would embolden domestic separatist
movements, threaten their domestic security, and lead to their territorial disintegration (Ayoob,
1995; Cervenka, 1969; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Herbst, 1989; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982;
Hill and Jewett, 1994, Touval, 1972).
The empirical results also show that vulnerability is important for all the 193 UN member
states studied in this thesis. Coggins’ (2014) study found positive results for the vulnerably
proposition in her study of recognition by great powers. This research expanded and applied the
proposition to all states regardless of their relative power position in the global politics. The
results show the logic of the proposition to be valid across all states. It predicts a general pattern
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for vulnerable states’ behavior regarding recognition. Findings of this study disagree with the
positions of some scholars challenging the vulnerability proposition. For instance, Sideman
(1997), Lewis (2002), Laitan and Samatar (1987) casted doubt over the deterrence effects of
vulnerability citing several countries that supported secession abroad and even recognized
aspirant states. However, findings of this study only demonstrate a cumulative and general
behavior among states. Critics of vulnerability proposition are correct in referring to specific
cases where vulnerability has not deterred states susceptible to secession from supporting and
recognizing aspirant states. However, the outlier cases, Colombia and Russia for example, merit
in depth case studies to figure out the strategic calculations of these vulnerable countries’
recognition decisions.
The vulnerability proposition reflects realism’s view of international politics. According
to realism theory of IR, self-preservation, security, and national interest take precedent over other
concerns for states. The results corroborate realism’s prediction for behavior of states in
international politics. This study demonstrated that states vulnerable to separatist movements
avoided extending recognition to safeguard their national security and territorial integrity.
The next secondary research question examines the relationship between level of
democracy and recognition. This question is positively answered. Levels of democracy and
freedom among aspirant and parent states positively impact recognition of aspirant states by both
Free and Partly Free states. Free and partly free states when faced with the choice of supporting
the parent or aspirant states, gravitated towards the polities that were comparatively more
democratic and had a higher score of freedom. The empirical results, contrary to Ozpek’s
conclusion (2014), demonstrate that regime type and democracy positively influence democratic
recognizer’s choice of recognition. However, Ozpek (2014) only focused on great powers and
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determined that national interest and security take precedent over democratic values. This study
empirically substantiates the previous studies purported aspirant states’ effort to undertake
democratization in order to increase their chances of recognition by democratic states.
This cross-national Large-N empirical research emboldens previous scholars’ conclusion
about specific cases of aspirant states that undertake democratic reforms to influence their
chances of recognition by democratic states. The findings support Broers’ conclusion that both
home and aspirant states engage in “competitive democratization” to influence international
recognition by democratic states (2005, p.71). This research also attests the generalizability of
the “democratization-for-recognition strategy” (Baar et al, 2016, p.89) and the “strategy of
earned sovereignty” Scharf (2003, p.374) where aspirant states actively campaign for recognition
by democratic states through a demonstration of their democratic regimes.
The investigation of regime type in recognition reflected one of the primary arguments
proposed by the DPT. This study reaffirms the theoretical explanation of DPT in that
democracies perceive one another as legitimate and non-threatening. They cooperate with other
democratic states and are supportive of democratic movements globally. This study confirms that
democratic regimes generally favor expansion of democratic regimes (Shapiro, 2011). This study
also provides evidence for generalizability and validity of the proposed cooperative nature
among democracies and the overall promotion of democratization globally which is sometimes
referred to as “democratic solidarity” (Cooper and Legler, 2001; Niedererger, 2013). This
research reaffirms that DPT’s argument holds true and stands the test of time across crossnational empirical tests.
The last secondary research question investigates whether religion affects recognition.
The empirical results demonstrate the answer to be positive. However, the results are not
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parsimonious and straight forward. Religion was found to be a critical factor in extending
recognition to aspirant states among Islamic countries. Nonetheless recognition by Islamic
countries varied across cases. Somaliland, despite being a majority Islamic country, did not attain
recognition from any Islamic country. On the contrary, Palestine gained recognition by a
majority of Islamic countries while another Islamic aspirant, Western Sahara’s recognition, was
limited. The results are in line with the hypothesized prediction. Countries were predicted to
recognize an aspirant state when the home/parent state’s religion is opposite of the aspirant and
recognizer states. An example that demonstrates this can be recognition of Palestine by a
majority if Islamic countries. It can be argued that Israel, being a majority Jewish nation, seems
to have positively influenced Islamic countries’ motivation to recognize Palestine.
Religion did not constitute a major factor in extending recognition by a Christian country.
Unlike the case of Islam, Christian countries did not recognize Nagorno-Karabakh, a majority
Christian state, separating from Azerbaijan – a majority Muslim country. Contrary to the
predication of this study, a large number of Christian countries recognized Kosovo, where
majority identify as Muslim, which separated from Serbia with a majority Christian population.
One potential reason for the variation among Islamic and Christian countries could be that
majority of Christian countries have secular governments. Although this study proposed that
even secular governments and statesmen are influenced by majority religion, this empirical study
provided the opposite among Christian countries. Another potential explanation can be distance.
Distance between the aspirant and recognizer state was not included in this study. Future studies
that include distance, among other potential factors, could shed light over the variation of results
for Christian and Islamic countries. Another trajectory would be to conduct comparative case
studies to further investigate variation of recognition among Islamic and Christian countries.
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The only previous research that emphasizes the role of religion in motivating states to
withhold or extend recognition to aspirant states is by Mirilovic and Siroky (2014, 2015). Their
work was case specific and examined recognition of Kosovo, Palestine, and Israel. They focused
on aspirant states without introducing a choice for recognizer to pick sides between the home and
aspirant states. Their study found that countries with transitional religious ties to aspirant states
were more likely to recognize. Also, they concluded that religious regulation by state was
positively influencing recognition decision. This research took a different direction, focusing
only nominally on religious similarity and differences among the home, aspirant, and the
recognizer states.
This research established religion to fit in the constructivist theoretical framework. The
empirical results demonstrate that the provisions of constructivist theory, as relevant to religious,
provide inconclusive. Further future research could potentially establish a comparative
explanatory power of the theory compared to other IR theories relevant for recognition.
Government regulation of religion, of the four control variables, was not supported by the
empirical evidence to have a significant impact over recognition decision. This research
predicted that states with higher rate of religious regulation will recognize a coreligionist aspirant
states. The results proved the contrary to be the case. Future research only focusing on
government regulation independent of religious similarities between three entities of concern
(home, aspirant, and recognizer state) can establish further nuanced results.
The remaining three control variables – population, official state religion, GDP per capita –
were excluded from the statistical model. These variables were excluded due to unanticipated
challenges that emerged during the study and methodological limitations. The research design
presented a choice for a recognizer state to support either the home or parent state based on the
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religious similarities and level of democracy. As such, this the thesis initially predicated a
possible variation could exist between the size of the population and the GDP per capita of home
and aspirant states. However, after selection of cases based on the working definition, it was
revealed that all the aspirant states had lower population size and GDP per capita compared to
their parent states even after the subunits complete seceding the parent states, in all cases,
remained significantly larger in terms of GDP per capita and population. Thus, the lack of
variation placed constraints on the empirical analysis and therefore were dropped at later stage
while performing the statistical tests. Moreover, the official state religion was excluded from the
statistical analysis because the unavailability of reliable information about the state religions of
aspirant states made it impossible to construct the comparative research design similar to
restrictions with GDP per Capita and population.

Conclusion
This chapter presented the key findings of the statistical model followed by discussion of
the results. A Large-N cross-national empirical analysis was performed to investigate the causal
relationship of three main variables; vulnerability, regime type, and religion. There was
empirical evidence to support the vulnerability proposition, which was statistically significant.
States vulnerable to deistical separatism were shown to avoid extending recognition to aspirant
states. The results substantiated previous studies in support of the proposition. The evidence also
disagreed with critics of the proposition proving that states in general are deterred by the logic of
vulnerability. The outlier cases exception to the general pattern merit comparative case studies.
The evidence also supported that democracy influences recognition decisions among
democratic states, though there was variation between free and partly free. Both groups of

114

countries were positively influenced by the level of democracy among home and aspirant state.
Empirical results for the religion variable were twofold. Religion played a significantly positive
role in recognition decisions among Islamic countries. Religion proved to be statically significant
for Christian countries. However, the impact was opposite. Religion did not shape incentives of
Christian countries to extend recognition to aspirant states. Government regulation of religion
was statically insignificant. Inclusion of distance factor between the cases and recognizer states
can improve our understanding of the causal relationship between religion and recognition.
Islam, a sub-variable of religion, had the greatest impact in terms of absolute Z-values on
the dependent variable. The absolute values of the coefficient (Z-values) for each of the
independent variables is presented in Table: 4.2 below. The variables are ranked from 1 to 7. 1
shows the least impact while 7 indicates the greatest impact in terms of overall size of the
impact.

Table 4:2 Variable Level of Impact

(Intercept)
Recog_F
Recog_PF
Vulnerability
Recog_Christ
Recog_Islam
Recog_Gov_Reg_Religion

Estimate
-0.5627
0.7477
0.4822
-0.3699
-0.3660
0.7774
0.0012
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Std. Error
0.3784
0.1631
0.1504
0.1846
0.1496
0.1560
0.0388

z value
-1.49
4.58
3.21
-2.00
-2.45
4.98
0.03

Pr(>)
0.1370
0.0000
0.0013
0.0452
0.0144
0.0000
0.9754

Impact Size
2
6
5
3
4
7
1

CHAPTER 5:
CONCLUSION

Introduction
This chapter presents a summary and general conclusion about the main findings of the
research questions of this thesis. Moreover, the limitations and strengths of this thesis are
considered and suggestions for future research into international recognition of aspirant states are
presented. The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section restates the research questions,
significance of the study, and the main findings of the literature review. The next section
presents the main empirical findings. The last section entails a discussion of limitations of this
research and future research suggestions.

Research question and significance of study
The primary goal of this thesis was to assess what factors motivate states to extend or
withhold recognition to an aspirant state. The secondary objective of this thesis was to address
the terminological and definitional ambiguity in the literature and propose a parsimonious
definition and term that encompasses all the necessary components of these entities. The two
research questions and significance of the study are addressed below.
An assessment of the literature showed that despite tremendous progress in the study of
aspirant states, the scholarship remains persistently mired in controversy over precise definition
and terminology. Though there is improvement in the overall understanding and dynamics of
these non-state polities, the controversy over the use of the appropriate terms has not been
resolved. The myriad of different labels amalgamates into three broad terms—contested states,
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unrecognized states, and de facto states. Despite a few exceptions, almost all scholars combine
the term state with a prefix of their choice, which leads to scholars picking the term of their
choosing with due justification while studying these phenomena. Despite the controversy over
definitional disputes, the definitions are narrowing, and the concept stretching is contained. For
the purpose of this thesis, the term “aspirant” (Berg and Pegg, 2016; Geldenhuys, 2009;
Mirilovic and Siroky, 2015, 2016) was combined with the term state, thus forming ‘aspirant
state’. An aspirant state is an unrecognized or partially recognized recognition-seeking separatist
polity that has managed to break away from its parent state and meets the Montevideo
Convention criteria for statehood – (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) a
government; and (4) capacity to enter into relations with the other states – which aspires to
become a sovereign independent state and admitted to the international community. This
definition denotes two things. First, the entities meet the four criteria for statehood as enumerated
in the Montevideo Convention, which are partially recognized or unrecognized. Second, all these
entities aspire to become externally sovereign, internationally confirmed, and eventually
admitted to the UN as full members. Thus, the aspirant state captures all these aspects.
These nascent states have become permanent features of the international system. Though
these emerging states fulfill basic requirements for statehood, they are unrecognized or partially
recognized, which restricts their aspiration for gaining full statehood. In order for new states and
separatist polities to gain membership in the international community, they must secure
recognition by an overwhelming majority of states and especially the most powerful and
influential among them (Coggins, 2018). International recognition affirms their external
legitimacy, admission to the international society, and subsequent membership in the UN as
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sovereign states. Therefore, international recognition is the primary distinction between success
and failure for aspirant states seeking full statehood.
The existing research has focused on the internal dynamics of aspirant states, namely
state- and nation-building processes, democratization, and development of political, economic,
and social institutions. Though there are exceptions, the creation of new polities and their
international recognition has not been studied adequately by IR scholars (Coggins, 2011; KerLindsay, 2012; Cunningham, 2014; Griffiths, 2016). The literature on international recognition
of aspirant states is limited and often case specific. There are few systematic works directly
focusing empirically and theoretically on recognition of aspirant states. This thesis attempted to
fill the gap in the literature in regard to international recognition of aspirant states.
There are a number of reasons this study is important. First, the existing literature
provides unsatisfactory explanations for why states grant or withhold recognition to aspirant
states. Most studies on recognition have been case specific and limited. Second, the quest for
recognition is a significant incentive for aspirant states in undertaking effective state- and nationbuilding, development of political and economic institutions, and democratization (Richards and
Smith, 2015). Third, aspirant states are increasingly becoming important actors in the regional
and international politics over the past few decades. Non-recognition results in perpetual
militarized and fear-driven environments for residents of aspirant states and exacerbates the
already worsening situation among some of these aspirant states.
In order to the answer the main research question, the existing literature was reviewed,
which resulted in identification of six major factors that affect recognition. The first group of
factors included the international law, norms, and foreign policy doctrines. The international
legal aspect of recognition is debated between the constitutive and declaratory theories for
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statehood. The two norms of territorial integrity and self-determination relevant to international
recognition were ambiguous and in a debated status. The former emphasizes sovereignty and
unchangeable borders of states, while the latter, self-determination, advocates the right of people
to decide their political destiny and obliges the international community to assist such efforts.
Both norms were found to have an inconsequential empirical impact on states’ recognition
decision. Similarly, a number of foreign policy doctrines such as the Stimson, Tabor or
Woodrow Wilson, and the Estrada doctrines were found to be ineffective in setting a general
principle for existing states to follow in recognition of new states. Because there is no collective
procedure established yet for conferring recognition based on established legal principles, states
either ignore these provisions or bend them in favor of political realities and national interests.
The second group of factors influencing recognition was national politics and interest
groups. The domestic level factors, namely national politics, and the role of interest groups in
relationship with international recognition, were found to be less explored and case specific.
Most importantly, national politics influence foreign policy including recognition decisions when
the issue at hand is not a threat to national security.
The third recurrent factor in the literature was the vulnerability proposition, alternatively
called the vulnerability theory, which posits that states facing domestic secessionist movements
do not risk their own security and territorial integrity by extending recognition to another
aspirant state. Though a crucial factor behind recognition decisions, this variable has not been
empirically tested through a cross-national analysis.
The fourth factor was the home states’ role in influencing recognition decisions. Home
states that stand to lose territory often lobby other countries to withhold international recognition
from the aspiring state. Home states can deny independence, deploy military force, and request
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the international community to respect its territorial integrity by not recognizing the breakaway
region (Griffiths, 2016). Parent states do not always succeed in reversing secession or preventing
international recognition of their subunits. Several separatist entities such as Northern Cyprus,
Nagorno-Karabakh, Kosovo, Abkhazia, and others have survived and gained partial recognition.
The fifth factor was political regime types of the recognizer, aspirant and home states.
After recognition of Kosovo by the Western democracies, several other aspirant states such as
Somaliland, Abkhazia, and Palestine have tried to attract international recognition through
“democratization-for-recognition strategy” (Baar et al, 2016, p.89). Some aspirant states
accelerated their efforts in creating effective governments and democratic institutions, a new
approach which Scharf (2003, p.374) called “strategy of earned sovereignty”. Democratic states
were found to be reluctant in recognizing aspirant states breaking away from democratic states
and cautious in cases of secession emerging from autocratic states. The literature review showed
that there was a dearth of empirical cross-national study to determine recognition decisions by
democratic states.
The last factor identified was religion. Though scholarship connecting religion and
recognition decision is scarce, there is a growing literature on the important influence of culture
and identity, specifically religion and ethnic ties, in international politics (Gill, 2001). Religious
and ethnoreligious conflicts have a prominent international aspect. Their implications usually
involve cross-border and transitional actors (Fox, 2001, p.59-66). Fox and Sandler (2010)
enumerate the influence of religion in IR four ways. First, religion influences statesmen and
leaders through shaping their worldviews, behavior, and thoughts. Second, religion is a key
element in formation of identity. Third, religion is a source of legitimacy both at the national and
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international levels. Fourth, religion is associated with international intuitions that can influence
political process, for instance the Catholic Church and the Organization for Islamic Cooperation.
Assessment of the literature revealed two weaknesses or under-researched areas. First,
the research on recognition of aspirant states is often case specific and limited to a select number
of recognizers. Scholars have studied recognition of some single or multiple cases and focused
on a limited number of recognizers, the great powers for example, and their explanations are
specific to each case. Second, some variables affecting recognition are under researched. The
theory of vulnerability, the identity politics, and the role of regime type in recognition decisions,
when applied to all states in the international system, is ambiguous or debated.
The three variables—vulnerability proposition, regime type, religion—were placed
within the relevant IR theories. Establishing a connection between the independent variables and
the existing IR theories delivers two purposes. First, it serves as a guide on which to build and
structure the main arguments of this thesis. Second, positioning the main arguments within the
relevant theories provides an opportunity to assess which IR theory best describes recognition
decision among states.
In addition to the three main independent variables, four control variables were included
in order to control for alternative explanations of recognition--economic development of the
recognizer states; population of the recognizer, aspirant, and the home states; official state
religion; government regulation of religion.
This study employed a Large-N quantitative research design to test the set of hypotheses
that were formulated based on the three independent variables. The statistical method of Logistic
Regression was used due to the dichotomist outcome of the dependent variable. This study
empirically examined recognition of ten polities that met the working definition of an aspirant
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state: Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, Palestine, Taiwan, Transnistria,
South Ossetia, Somaliland, and Western Sahara. The unit of analysis was the country-level
recognition. The spatial domain included all sovereign UN member states. The temporal range
was the year 2011. Recognition is a changeable practice. States at various times withdraw,
freeze, or suspend recognition. Though the temporal range was restricted to 2011, it included
recognitions that precede 2011 and were not withdrawn or frozen by 2011. The next section
provides a summary of the empirical findings and their implications.

Empirical Findings
A Large-N cross-national empirical analysis was performed to investigate the causal
relationship of three main variables—vulnerability, regime type, and religion—over recognition
of aspirant states. This research hypothesized that states vulnerable to domestic separatism were
unlikely to extend recognition to an aspirant state. The answer to the first hypothesis was
positive. The empirical evidence was statistically significant and supported the logic of the
vulnerability proposition.
The empirical results are broadly in line with some previous research examining the
relationship between vulnerability and recognition decision. Coggins (2014) concluded that
vulnerability deterred great powers from recognizing aspirant states. This research demonstrated
the logic of the proposition to be valid across all states by applying the proposition to all states
irrespective of their relative power position in the international community. It predicts a general
pattern for vulnerable states’ behavior regarding recognition.
Findings of this thesis run counter to the position of some scholars challenging the
explanatory power of the vulnerability proposition. A number of scholars argued that
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vulnerability does not always deter states from supporting separatist movements abroad referring
to several vulnerable countries that supported secessionist entities and even recognized aspirant
states (Lewis, 2002; Laitan and Samatar, 1987; Sideman, 1997). Their criticism is perhaps valid
and potentially correct. This study focused on demonstrating an aggregate and general behavior
among states vulnerable to domestic separatism. There are several outlier cases where they
vulnerability proposition does not hold true. These outlier cases, Colombia and Russia for
example, merit in-depth case studies. Furthermore, this study only addressed recognition of
aspirant states, and argued vulnerable states will not recognize aspirant states. Vulnerability
potentially deter states to recognize aspirant states and does not prevent them from supporting
secession movements abroad.
This thesis maintained that the vulnerability proposition reflected realism’s view of
the international politics—self-preservation, security, and national interest take precedent over
other concerns for states. The empirical findings substantiated realism’s prediction for behavior
of states in international politics. This study showed that states vulnerable to separatist
movements avoided granting recognition to safeguard their national security and territorial
integrity.
The second and third hypotheses examined the relationship between level of democracy
among states and recognition. Results of the empirical analysis demonstrated that recognition
decisions were positively influenced by the level of democratic-ness of the home and aspirant
states. The results showed that both free and partly free countries gravitated towards the entity
that was comparatively freer and more democratic. Therefore, this study suggests the existence
of a patterned behavior among democratic states regarding recognition decisions.
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The empirical results provided evidence contrary to Ozpek’s (2014) conclusion that
regime type and democracy does not positively influence democratic recognizer’s choice of
recognition. However, Ozpek (2014) conclusion was limited to great powers and determined that
national interest and security concerns took precedent over democratic values. This research
provided further validation of previous studies that demonstrated how aspirant states engage in
effective democratization to improve their chances of recognition. These findings are generally
compatible and support Broers’ conclusion that both home and aspirant states engage in
“competitive democratization” to influence international recognition by democratic states (2005,
p.71). This research also attests the generalizability of the “democratization-for-recognition
strategy” (Baar et al, 2016, p.89) and the “strategy of earned sovereignty” Scharf (2003, p.374)
in that aspirant states campaign for recognition by democratic states through a democratization.
This thesis argued that democratic peace theory served as the main theoretical framework
in investigating the relationship between regime type and recognition. This study reaffirms the
theoretical explanation of DPT in that democracies perceive other democracies as legitimate and
friendly. This study confirms that democratic regimes generally favor expansion of democratic
regimes (Shapiro, 2011). The results demonstrate that there is evidence for generalizability and
validity of the proposed cooperative nature among democracies and the overall promotion of
democratization globally which is sometimes referred to as “democratic solidarity” (Cooper and
Legler, 2001; Niedererger, 2013). This research confirms that DPT’s argument holds true and
stands the test of time across cross-national empirical tests.
The last two hypotheses evaluated the impact of religion on recognition. Though the
empirical results demonstrated both hypotheses to be positive, the results varied across different
religions. While religion was an important factor influencing recognition decisions, it did not
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impact every country positively. Religion constituted a major influencing factor among Islamic
countries, while its impact was insignificant among Christian countries. One potential reason for
the variation among Islamic and Christian countries could be that the majority of Christian
countries have secular governments. Although this study proposed that even secular governments
and statesmen are influenced by majority religion, this empirical study provided the opposite
among Christian countries.

General Conclusion
This thesis assessed what factors motivated states to grant or withhold recognition to an
aspirant state. While there are several potential factors in the literature explaining what shapes
states incentives to recognize an aspirant state, this thesis focused on empirically examining
three—vulnerability, regime, and religion—which were under-researched and or their impact on
recognition was found to be inconclusive in the existing literature.
A Large-N cross-national empirical analysis was performed to investigate the impact of
the three factors on recognition. The first factor, the vulnerability proposition, was found
statistically significant and its explanatory power positive. The empirical results proved its
argument that states vulnerable to domestic separatism are unlikely to recognize an aspirant state.
The second factor, regime type, was found to be statistically significant. Democratic states
preferred to recognize aspirant states that were comparatively more democratic than their parent
states. Lastly, the third factor concerning religious affinities was found to be statistically
significant with a variegated explanatory power. Religion was found to be an important factor
among Islamic countries while it did not constitute a positively influencing factor for Christian
countries.
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This thesis contributes to the existing literature on recognition of aspirant states in two
important areas. First, it attempted to fill a gap in the literature by cross-nationally and
empirically studying the theory of vulnerability, religious affinities, and the role of democracy in
international recognition of aspirant states. Previous studies either overlooked these variables,
examined them separately, and or were often case specific. Second, an assessment of the
literature shows there are few systematic works directly focusing empirically and theoretically on
recognition of aspirant states where a general pattern of behavior could be drawn to
systematically explain recognition by all states in the system. This thesis has attempted to fill this
gap by proposing that when all other potential explanations are constant or absent, susceptibility
of states to domestic separatism, regime type, and religious affinities can explain why states
extend or withhold recognition to an aspirant state.

Limitations and recommendation for future research
This research presented an attempt to understand the dynamics of aspirant states’
international recognition empirically and systematically. There were a number of limitations that
emerged during the research process. Moreover, this study shows that there are several questions
and potential avenues for future research. A discussion of the methodological and conceptual
challenges and future potential avenues of inquiry is presented below.
The first limitation that resulted in exclusion of three control variables – population,
official state religion, and GDP per capita – derived from the research design. The format of the
research design presented recognizer states with a choice between the parent and home states to
support when evaluating religious similarities and the level of democracy. After selection of
cases based on the working definition, it was revealed that all the aspirant states had lower
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population size and GDP per capita compared to their parent states. The lack of variation placed
constraints on the empirical analysis. Therefore, the two controls were dropped while performing
the statistical tests. The official state religion, another control, was excluded due to unavailability
of reliable data about the aspirant states, which made it challenging to construct a reliable
comparative research design similar to the population size and GDP per capita.
Rich and economically developed countries display a pro-status quo bias and are
reluctant to admit new members to the club of sovereign states compared to countries classified
as lower and middle-income economies (Ker-Lindsay, 2012; Maoz, 1989; Paquin, 2010). A
large-N analysis weighing the relative influence of countries based on their economic
development can investigate the purported relationship. The World Bank published has a new
classification of world’s economies based on the estimates of gross national income (GNI) per
capita, which is a more realistic and accurate measurement of economic development among
countries that can be used for future research (World Bank Data Team, 2018).
Another important limitation of the analysis of the relationship between recognition and
religion was that this study focused on religious similarities and differences based on the
majority religion in each country irrespective of denominational differences. Iran and Iraq, both
majority Shiite countries, were studied as Islamic countries despite the contentious differences
between the Shiite and Sunni sects of Islam. Similarly, Ireland, a majority catholic country,
Georgia, a majority Orthodox Christian nation, and Kenya and the U.S. with a plurality of
Protestant Christians were all labeled as Christian countries. There is potential for future research
to consider these differences, especially the historical and current intra-religious schismatic
factions and contentions when analyzing the causal link between religion and recognition in a
more focused and nuanced manner.
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There are two more potential areas for research to analyze the relationship between
religion and recognition. First, analyzing the relationship between the religion of the leaders of
the recognizer and aspirant states can produce fruitful insights into recognition decisions. Not all
leaders adhere to the same religion or denomination as the majority population. A nuanced focus
on religious views of leaders is a future potential research area. Second, investigating the
relationship between religion and recognition while incorporating the level of secularization can
clarify how much religion influences recognition and foreign policy decisions in general. States
with secular governments, at least in theory, expectedly minimally rely on religion as a main
factor when adjusting their relations with other countries and aspirant states alike.
Ethnic ties and kinship influence recognition of aspirant states. States who see the
aspirant states’ population “as more self-like will be deemed more deserving of recognition and
external sovereignty (Coggins, 2014, p.143). Onuha (2012) argues that statesmen who share
similar ethnic identity with secessionist movements in other countries have demonstrated a
willingness to support the separatists’ ambition for statehood. Though ethnicity is an important
explanatory variable, it was not included in this study. The exclusion primarily was due to the
research design and the scope of this research. This thesis studied recognition by all the UN
member states. There is a lower probability of ethnic ties between the recognizer, aspirant, and
home states at a global scale. Ethnicity and kinship is more applicable when studying recognition
of aspirant states at a regional level as states in the vicinity of the aspirant states usually share
ethnic and cultural ties.
Previous research on recognition focused on some single or multiple cases of aspirant
states and often entailed recognition by a limited number of states. Coggins (2011, 2014) studied
recognition of nascent states by great powers. Ozpek (2014) investigated the casual link between
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competitive democratization and recognition by great powers in the international system. This
research studied recognition by all the UN member states disregarding their relative power
position in the global politics. As the literature reviewed showed recognition by great powers is
instrumental in affecting other states’ recognition decisions. As Coggins (2014) showed some
states confer recognition to an aspirant state only after a great power grants recognition. Future
research focusing on recognition by all states can incorporate great powers as a control variable,
which can provide new insights on the impact of great powers’ role in motivation of states to
grant or avoid recognition to an aspirant state, especially in building a comprehensive theory of
recognition.
Another key area of future research is the relationship between distance and recognition.
Incorporating distance as a control variable could have added important value to this research.
Distance could be a potential factor why certain states vulnerable to domestic separatism,
Colombia for example, were not deterred from granting recognition to Kosovo. Distance could
also explain why a large number of Islamic countries in the greater Middle East recognized
Palestine, but not all of them recognized Kosovo and Western Sahrawi Arab Republic. Future
research can further analyze the relationship between recognition and distance. The last potential
area of research is an in-depth comparative analysis of legal and political factors behind
recognition decisions. A review of the literature showed that states’ recognition decisions are
primarily driven by political factors. Though states often trump international law or use legal
principles as camouflage to justify political incentives, a Large-N quantitative analysis could
reveal the casual force of political and legal factors.
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APPENDIX A:
CODING RULES AND DATA

This appendix presents supplemental coding of independent variables that were not
elaborated in detail in the research design and methodology chapter as well as the dataset used in
this research. The appendix proceeds as follows. First, the coding rules for the three independent
variables is presented. Second, due to the large volume of the dataset a link is provided to
electronically access the dataset.

Vulnerability
This variable is binary. The expected results are dichotomous: recognition vs nonrecognition. The recognizer states follow the below coding.
0 = No secession
1 = yes, no violence per year
2 = yes, 25-999 battle related deaths per year
3 = yes, min 1000 battle related deaths per year
The level and intensity of secession varies among recognizer states. However, states
vulnerable to domestic separatism are coded vulnerable (1) regardless of the intensity of the
secessionism. States not facing domestic separatism are coded (0). Thus, vulnerable states coded
(1) are not expected to recognize an aspirant state. While invulnerable states (0) are expected to
recognize an aspirant state. The direction of the relationship between the dependent and
independent variable is negative. The table blow summarizes the coding rules and expected
results
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Recognizer
0
1-3

Result
Recognition
unrecognition
X
X

Relationship Direction
Negative

Regime type: the role of democracy in recognition (Democratic Solidarity)
The home, aspirant, and recognizer states are labeled as Free, Partly Free, and Not Free.
Freedom House (FH) divides all states and disputed territories into three categories based on the
1-7 scale: Free (1-2.5), Partly Free (3-5), and Not Free (5.5-7). The format of the research design
presents recognizer states with a choice between the parent and home states to support when
evaluating the level of democracy. The table below shows the coding rules for this variable.
Term
Unlikely
Likely
More likely
Highly likely

Code
0
1
2
3

Relationship Direction
Positive

Due to the trichotomous logic of this variable the all-possible combinations of the variable
and expected outcome was created as shown below.
Recognizer State
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF

Aspirant State
F
F
F
PF
PF
PF
NF
NF
NF
F
F
F
PF
PF
PF
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Home State
F
PF
NF
F
PF
NF
F
PF
NF
F
PF
NF
F
PF
NF

Expected Result
2
2
3
1
1
2
0
0
0
2
2
3
1
1
3

PF
PF
PF
NF
NF
NF
NF
NF
NF
NF
NF
NF

NF
NF
NF
F
F
F
PF
PF
PF
NF
NF
NF

F
PF
NF
F
PF
NF
F
PF
NF
F
PF
NF

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Religions affinity
Like regime type the format of the research design presents recognizer states with a choice
between the parent and home states to support on the basis of religious similarities or differences.
The table below shows the coding rule for this variable.
Term
Unlikely
Likely
More likely
Highly likely

Code
0
1
2
3

Relationship Direction
Positive

There are seven groups of recognizer states based on the majority religion of their
population. The table below shows all-possible combinations of the variable and the expected
outcome.
Recognizer State
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism

Aspirant State
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity

Home State
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
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Expected Result
1
3
3
3
3
0
1
1

Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Chinese Folk Religion
Chinese Folk Religion
Chinese Folk Religion
Chinese Folk Religion
Chinese Folk Religion
Chinese Folk Religion
Chinese Folk Religion
Chinese Folk Religion
Chinese Folk Religion
Chinese Folk Religion
Chinese Folk Religion
Chinese Folk Religion
Chinese Folk Religion
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Hinduism
Hinduism

Christianity
Christianity
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Buddhism
Buddhism

Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
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1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
2
2
2
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
3
3
1
3
2
1
1
0
1
0
1
1

Hinduism
Hinduism
Hinduism
Hinduism
Hinduism
Hinduism
Hinduism
Hinduism
Hinduism
Hinduism
Hinduism
Hinduism
Hinduism
Irreligious
Irreligious
Irreligious
Irreligious
Irreligious
Irreligious
Irreligious
Irreligious
Irreligious
Irreligious
Irreligious
Irreligious
Irreligious
Irreligious
Irreligious
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam

Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Islam

Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
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2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
3

Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Judaism
Judaism
Judaism
Judaism
Judaism
Judaism
Judaism
Judaism
Judaism
Judaism
Judaism
Judaism
Judaism
Judaism
Judaism

Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Buddhism
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Christianity
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam
Islam

Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism
Buddhism
Chinese Folk Religion
Christianity
Islam
Judaism

3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0

Government Regulation of Religion
Operationally, government regulation of religion is defined as the “restrictions placed on
the practice, profession, or selection of religion" (Grim and Finke, 2007, p.636). Information for
this variable comes from ARDA. Building on the definition of Grim and Finke (2007), ARDA
established a database where countries are ranked on scale of 0-10, with 0 being the least
regulation and 10 the most regulation. This variable is an additional control measure on the
religious affinities variable.
When the home and aspirant states have the same religion that is different from the parent
state, a recognizer state with higher regulation of religion is expected to recognize the aspirant
state. On the contrary, when the parent and recognizer states are the same religion that is
different from the aspirant state, recognition is less likely to follow when recognizer state has a
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higher score of government regulation. The table below shows the coding scheme and the
relationship between the independent and dependent variables.

Recogniz
er
X
X

Aspira
nt
X
X

Home
State
Y
Y

Gov. Regulation of
Religion
0 - 2.5
2.6 - 5

X

X

Y

5.1 - 7.5

X
All
others

X

Y

7.6 - 10

X
X

Y
Y

X
X

0 - 2.5
2.6 - 5

X

Y

X

5.1 - 7.5

X
All
others

Y

X

7.6 - 10

Expected
Result
1 (Less likely)
2 (Likely)
3 (More
Likely)
4 (Highly
Likely)

Relationship
Direction

Positive

0 (Unlikely)
1(Less likely)
2(Likely)
3 (More
Likely)
4(Highly
Likely)

Negative

0 (Unlikely)

Dataset
Due to its large size, it is impossible to include the entire dataset in this document. The
link below provides electronic access to the dataset.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/5ud54czwhclh9fw/AADyxidvBdFwo5_pvO8AkxPDa?dl=0
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